# TLS (Transport Layer Security)

TLS (Transport Layer Security) is an Internet security protocol that enables client/server applications to communicate while protecting against eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

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## CVE-2026-133648 - Flowintel Disables TLS Certificate Verification for MISP and Mail Connections

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-133648 - Flowintel Disables TLS Certificate Verification for MISP and Mail Connections](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-133648-flowintel-disables-tls-certificate-verification-for-misp-and-mail-connections-145915.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133648>)

Author: cvefeed.io

Published: 2026-11-20T10:23:53Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/email.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-133648](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-133648.md>), [flowintel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flowintel.md>), [mail](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mail.md>), [misp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/misp.md>), [published](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/published.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>)

### AI overview

Flowintel versions before 4.1.0 disabled TLS certificate verification for MISP HTTPS API calls and used unverified SSL contexts for IMAP TLS and SMTP STARTTLS connections. An unauthenticated attacker with a network position between Flowintel and a configured MISP or mail server could impersonate that server, capture API keys or mail credentials, read exchanged threat intelligence, or modify data returned to Flowintel. The described attack requires no user interaction.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-133648 Published : Nov. 20, 2026, 10:23 a.m. | 38 minutes ago Description :Flowintel disabled TLS certificate verification for all MISP API connections and used unverified SSL contexts for IMAP and SMTP STARTTLS mail connections. This allowed an on-path (man-in-the-middle) attacker positioned between Flowintel and its MISP or mail servers to impersonate the remote server and intercept sensitive data. Affected connections include: - All MISP HTTPS API calls (event retrieval, attribute search, event creation, connectivity checks, and API validation) - SMTP STARTTLS connections used for sending email notifications - IMAP TLS connections used for fetching mail archives and testing connectivity An attacker who can observe or intercept network traffic between Flowintel and the MISP or mail server could: - Capture MISP API keys and mail credentials (SMTP/IMAP passwords) - Read all threat intelligence data exchanged (events, attributes, objects, reports) - Inject or modify threat intelligence data returned to Flowintel The vulnerability required no authentication on the part of the attacker and no user interaction; it was exploitable by any party with a network position between Flowintel and its configured MISP or mail endpoints. Affected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0. Severity: 9.9 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Introducing mTLS for Network Load Balancer

DevFeed: [Introducing mTLS for Network Load Balancer](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/introducing-mtls-for-network-load-balancer-144602.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/networking-and-content-delivery/introducing-mtls-for-network-load-balancer/>)

Author: Rizwan Mushtaq

Published: 2026-11-19T22:45:08Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Networking & Content Delivery](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/networking-content-delivery.md>)

Topics: [Load Balancing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/load-balancing.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Amazon CloudWatch](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-cloudwatch.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [advanced-300](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/advanced-300.md>), [allowed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allowed.md>), [amazon-cloudwatch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-cloudwatch.md>), [announcements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announcements.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [aws](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aws.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [cloudwatch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudwatch.md>), [elastic-load-balancing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/elastic-load-balancing.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [load-balancer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/load-balancer.md>), [logs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/logs.md>), [metrics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/metrics.md>), [monitor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitor.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [mutual-tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mutual-tls.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [spiffe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spiffe.md>), [store](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/store.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [trust](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/trust.md>)

### AI overview

Network Load Balancer (NLB) can verify client certificates at a TLS listener, so only clients that pass trust, optional identity filters, and revocation checks reach backend targets; targets receive no client certificate data. Configure verify mode with a trust store built from a CA bundle in Amazon S3, optionally add a CRL, and optionally filter on certificate CN, OU, DNS SAN, or URI SAN (including SPIFFE IDs). Filters use exact or prefix matching, are OR-combined, and apply per listener. NLB checks trust chains, certificate expiry and purpose, then filters and revocation; expired certificates can be allowed through an advanced setting. CRLs are imported when added and must be added again when updated. Access logs record authentication failures, while CloudWatch metrics cover handshakes, errors, latency, and certificate expiration. The article also describes setup prerequisites, testing, trust store sharing, limits, and configuration through console, CLI, SDKs, or CloudFormation.

### Source excerpt

Network Load Balancer now offloads mutual TLS for you. Learn how to attach a trust store, validate client certificates against your revocation lists, restrict access by CN, OU, or SPIFFE ID with client certificate filtering, and monitor connections with access logs and Amazon CloudWatch metrics.

## Automated Certificate Management is Moving to ECDSA Certificates

DevFeed: [Automated Certificate Management is Moving to ECDSA Certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/automated-certificate-management-is-moving-to-ecdsa-certificates-144027.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.heroku.com/blog/automated-certificate-management-is-moving-to-ecdsa-certificates/>)

Author: Emily Huang

Published: 2026-11-18T23:15:28Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Heroku](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/heroku.md>)

Topics: [ECDSA](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ecdsa.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>)

Tags: [automated-certificate-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automated-certificate-management.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/keys.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [rsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rsa.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-certificates.md>)

### AI overview

Heroku ACM will begin automatically switching eligible apps from RSA to ECDSA certificates on December 21, 2026, with the rollout due to finish by January 29, 2027. ECDSA provides forward secrecy on every connection and stronger keys; Heroku says it also improves the SSL Labs grade from B to A. Most apps need no action: traffic monitoring is used to keep apps on RSA when clients appear incompatible, though rare clients may be missed. App owners can test clients with ecc256.badssl.com, retain or restore RSA with `acm-rsa-cert`, or opt into ECDSA early with `acm-ec-cert`; if both features are enabled, RSA takes priority. The change covers custom domains on Common Runtime and custom and default domains in Fir Private Spaces. Uploaded certificates and Common Runtime's default `*.herokuapp.com` domains are unaffected; Cedar-generation Private Spaces remain on RSA unless ECDSA is enabled.

### Source excerpt

Heroku Automated Certificate Management (ACM) is moving from Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) keys to Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) keys for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates it issues. ECDSA certificates are more secure: every connection gets forward secrecy, and the keys are stronger. They're also the only certificate type allowed in the strictest profile of [...] The post Automated Certificate Management is Moving to ECDSA Certificates appeared first on Heroku.

## CVE-2026-123007: Critical NGINX HTTP/2 Integer Underflow Leads to RCE (FIXED)

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-123007: Critical NGINX HTTP/2 Integer Underflow Leads to RCE (FIXED)](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-123007-critical-nginx-http-2-integer-underflow-leads-to-rce-fixed-141104.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-cve-2026-123007-critical-nginx-http-2-integer-underflow-leads-to-rce-fixed>)

Author: Stephen Fewer

Published: 2026-11-18T13:56:42Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Rapid7 Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/rapid7-cybersecurity-blog.md>)

Topics: [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nginx.md>), [Memory Safety](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/memory-safety.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Internet Traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/internet-traffic.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [code-execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-execution.md>), [corruption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/corruption.md>), [critical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/critical.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-123007](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-123007.md>), [cybersecurity-company](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity-company.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [exposure-assessment-platform](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposure-assessment-platform.md>), [exposure-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exposure-management.md>), [f5](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/f5.md>), [flow-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flow-control.md>), [http-2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http-2.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [managed-detection-and-response](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/managed-detection-and-response.md>), [managed-security-solutions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/managed-security-solutions.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [network-bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-bandwidth.md>), [network-traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-traffic.md>), [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nginx.md>), [proof-of-concept](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proof-of-concept.md>), [rapid7](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rapid7.md>), [rapid7-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rapid7-intelligence.md>), [rce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/rce.md>), [remote-code-execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote-code-execution.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [vulnerabilities-and-exploits](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities-and-exploits.md>), [vulnerability-disclosure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability-disclosure.md>), [vulnerability-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability-management.md>)

### AI overview

CVE-2026-123007 is a critical nginx HTTP/2 integer underflow that can enable unauthenticated code execution in the nginx worker under specific conditions. Rapid7's proof of concept worked on a Linux/amd64 nginx 1.31.8 Docker image with HTTP/2 and TLS enabled. The exploit cancels queued response data, causing nginx to restore flow-control credit above the HTTP/2 limit; a later unsigned subtraction underflows, and excessive credit becomes an invalid response length that can trigger out-of-bounds memory access during buffered TLS copying. Exploitation requires about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic in the overview; the analysis estimates about 119 GiB plaintext for the demonstrated route, plus TLS and network overhead. Bandwidth and nginx's default one-hour connection lifetime constrain feasibility, and proxied HTTP/2 frames may not preserve the required pattern. The demonstrated copy behavior also depends on a specific x86-64 glibc EVEX/YMM implementation and CPU features; other viable RCE methods are not known. Impact is limited to the worker's permissions. The excerpt says vendor fixes are available but does not identify versions or patch steps.

### Source excerpt

Overview Today, both Rapid7 and F5 are disclosing CVE-2026-123007, a critical integer underflow vulnerability affecting nginx HTTP/2, which can allow for unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) against affected servers under certain conditions. CVE ID Description CWE CVSSv4 CVE-2026-123007 HTTP/2 flow-control memory corruption permitting worker-context RCE CWE-191 (Integer Underflow) 9.2 (Critical) nginx can miscalculate how much response data an HTTP/2 client has allowed it to send. A remote, unauthenticated client can exploit this error by cancelling queued response data, then make nginx use an invalid length when copying a later response. The resulting memory corruption can disclose data, interrupt service, and execute code with the nginx worker process's permissions. Impact Rapid7 has developed a proof-of-concept to demonstrate leveraging CVE-2026-123007 for unauthenticated RCE against a vulnerable linux/amd64 Docker image running nginx version 1.31.8, as shown below in Figure 1. The target nginx server's configuration had http2 on and TLS enabled. Note that for brevity, video playback is at 8x speed. Figure 1: Video demonstrating unauthenticated RCE against NGINX 1.31.8 via CVE-2026-123007 Leveraging CVE-2026-123007 for RCE requires a significant amount of network traffic to be transmitted, approximately 128 GB of HTTP/2 data. Both available network bandwidth and connection timeouts will place practical limitations on Internet exploitation. In the above example shown in Figure 1, exploitation takes two and a half minutes. The approximate timings to transmit the required network data over a 10 Gbit/s network is two minutes, while on a 1 Gbit/s network it is seventeen minutes. Due to nginx's default one hour connection lifetime, a network slower than approximately 300 Mbit/s will take over the one hour connection limit threshold and will not be able to succeed. Additionally, should an HTTP/2 connection be proxied, the precise attacker-controlled HTTP/2 frames

## Microsoft announces Windows Server 2028 with hardened security

DevFeed: [Microsoft announces Windows Server 2028 with hardened security](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/microsoft-announces-windows-server-2028-with-hardened-security-140170.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-announces-windows-server-2028-with-hardened-security/>)

Author: Sergiu Gatlan

Published: 2026-11-18T09:24:31Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [BleepingComputer](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/bleepingcomputer.md>)

Topics: [Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/windows.md>), [systems](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/systems.md>), [virtual machines](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/virtual-machines.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [kerberos](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kerberos.md>), [observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/observability.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [accelerated](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accelerated.md>), [accelerators](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/accelerators.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-accelerators](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-accelerators.md>), [ai-inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-inference.md>), [computer-help](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer-help.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [confidential-vm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/confidential-vm.md>), [enterprise-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/enterprise-infrastructure.md>), [ignite](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ignite.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [mac](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mac.md>), [malware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware.md>), [malware-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/malware-removal.md>), [microsoft](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microsoft.md>), [operating-system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operating-system.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [spyware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/spyware.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tech-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tech-support.md>), [technical-support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-support.md>), [virus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus.md>), [virus-removal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/virus-removal.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>), [windows-insider](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows-insider.md>), [windows-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows-server.md>), [windows-server-2028](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows-server-2028.md>)

### AI overview

Windows Server 2028 is announced with hardened Server Core settings enabled by default, covering identity, network exposure, cryptography, administration, code integrity, remote access, and auditing. Admins can relax specific settings through a new security baseline. The article says Trusted Launch protects VM boot integrity and Confidential VM support is beginning on supported hardware. Some planned hardening, including NTLM blocking and hardware-backed platform protection, is still in progress. Other announced changes include Intune management for eligible persistent servers, native NVMe and NVMe over TCP/RDMA support, ReFS boot, and tools for deploying inference environments and managing accelerated hardware and models. Testing is available through the Windows Insider Program or an application to the Server Technology Adoption Program.

### Source excerpt

Microsoft has announced Windows Server 2028, the next major release of its server operating system, at the Ignite 2026 conference on Tuesday. [...]

## PQC Migration: End-to-End Performance Profiling of Post Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms in mTLS

DevFeed: [PQC Migration: End-to-End Performance Profiling of Post Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms in mTLS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/pqc-migration-end-to-end-performance-profiling-of-post-quantum-cryptographic-algorithms-in-mtls-139318.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.21206>)

Author: Rahul, Manjesh K. Hanawal, Sameer G. Kulkarni, Saravanan V, K. Tirumaleswar Reddy

Published: 2026-11-17T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>)

Tags: [1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-3.md>), [algorithms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/algorithms.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/energy.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [nist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nist.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc.md>), [profiling](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/profiling.md>), [setup](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/setup.md>), [speed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/speed.md>), [throughput](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/throughput.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-1-3.md>), [transport-layer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transport-layer-security.md>)

### AI overview

The reported tests found no measurable TLS 1.3 performance degradation from standardized post-quantum algorithms, despite their larger keys. Hybrid algorithms did degrade performance, with the impact becoming more pronounced under adverse network conditions. The authors therefore suggest making hybrid migration sensitive to network conditions. Their setup measured throughput, connection time, energy, and CPU cycles across client-server connections; the supplied excerpt gives no detailed measurements or algorithm-by-algorithm results.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.21206v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Emerging quantum computers threaten to break the classical key exchange algorithms. To safeguard against these threats, migration to new quantum-safe algorithms is underway and expected to be expedited. Though resistant to attacks, the quantum safe algorithms may impact the real-world performance due to their large key lengths. In this work, we analyze the end-to-end performance of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol with the post-quantum (PQ) and hybrid cryptographic algorithms standardized by NIST. We develop a test setup to evaluate the performance of TLS connections between a client and a server under various network conditions. We focus on the impact of the new algorithms on the speed (throughput, connection time) and sustainability (energy, CPU cycles) of TLS 1.3. Our analysis demonstrates that the standardized post-quantum algorithms do not introduce any measurable performance degradations in TLS 1.3, despite their larger key lengths. However, hybrid algorithms introduce noticeable performance degradation, which becomes increasingly pronounced under adverse network conditions. Our analysis suggests that migration to hybrid algorithms should be ``network condition aware'' as poor network conditions can severely degrade performance in TLS 1.3. We provide anonymised link to the code and a web interface to analyse performance of various combination of algorithms.

## CVE-2026-125275 - A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-125275 - A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-125275-a-device-certificate-whose-ca-isn-t-registered-can-keep-a-tls-handshake-running-forever-136468.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125275>)

Author: cvefeed.io

Published: 2026-11-17T03:17:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-125275](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-125275.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/denial-of-service.md>), [erlang](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/erlang.md>), [erlang-otp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/erlang-otp.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [nerves-hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub.md>), [nerves-hub-web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub-web.md>), [nerveshub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerveshub.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [root](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root.md>), [store](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/store.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

In NervesHub versions 1.0.0 through before 2.5.4, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause denial of service by presenting a TLS client certificate whose chain reaches a root trusted by the device endpoint but contains no CA registered in NervesHub. The verification callback returns :unknown_ca; Erlang/OTP ssl treats this as a missing trust anchor, retries the same root indefinitely, and the handshake process repeatedly queries the database even after the client disconnects, until the node restarts. Public CA roots are trusted by default unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is configured, so a client-auth-capable certificate from a public CA can trigger the issue. A chain ending at a root outside the trust store is rejected once.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-125275 Published : Nov. 17, 2026, 3:17 a.m. | 1 hour, 3 minutes ago Description :Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts. The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4. Severity: 8.2 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Identifying FortiGate Firmware From a Single ClientHello

DevFeed: [Identifying FortiGate Firmware From a Single ClientHello](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/identifying-fortigate-firmware-from-a-single-clienthello-135997.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/fortigate-firmware-clienthello>)

Author: Adam Powis

Published: 2026-11-16T00:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [VulnCheck](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/vulncheck.md>)

Topics: [Fortigate](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/fortigate.md>), [Exposure Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exposure-management.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [cve remediation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cve-remediation.md>), [threat detection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/threat-detection.md>)

Tags: [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [fingerprint](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fingerprint.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [fortigate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fortigate.md>), [fortios](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fortios.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [internet](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/internet.md>), [management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/management.md>), [port](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/port.md>), [range](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/range.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [version](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/version.md>)

### AI overview

The study found 375,904 internet-facing FortiGate hosts exposing FGFM on port 541; Fortinet says this management port should not be internet-accessible. Although only 269 of 838,100 hosts identified as FortiOS advertised a version, a TLS ClientHello sent by each exposed host can be fingerprinted with JA4 and mapped to one of six generations and a range of FortiOS versions. Comparing those ranges with vulnerability data, the researchers estimate that 160,171 hosts (42.6%) are in generations where every measured version has a known-exploited CVE. This is a generation-level exposure estimate, not a verdict on each host's exact version; some generations combine supported and end-of-life branches, and unmeasured versions and older CVE ranges limit the counts. The researchers recommend restricting FGFM on ports 541 and 542 to management networks or required peer addresses. They also provide Suricata and Snort rules because those tools do not recognize this listener-sent ClientHello through their usual TLS or JA4 parsing.

### Source excerpt

About 376,000 internet-facing FortiGate hosts expose their FGFM management port and answer a connection with a TLS ClientHello. A JA4 fingerprint of that ClientHello places each host in a FortiOS generation, which maps to a range of versions and the CVEs that affect them. 160,171 hosts (42.6%) are in generations where every version we measured has a known-exploited CVE.

## CVE-2026-102612 - BACnet Stack: BACnet/SC hub never requires a client cert, so any host joins the mesh unauthenticated

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-102612 - BACnet Stack: BACnet/SC hub never requires a client cert, so any host joins the mesh unauthenticated](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-102612-bacnet-stack-bacnet-sc-hub-never-requires-a-client-cert-so-any-host-joins-the-mesh-unauthenticated-132626.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102612>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; github.com

Published: 2026-11-13T19:17:37Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [WebSocket](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/websocket.md>)

Tags: [bacnet-stack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bacnet-stack.md>), [bacnetstack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bacnetstack.md>), [c](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c.md>), [ca](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ca.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [clients](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clients.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-102612](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-102612.md>), [cvss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cvss.md>), [cwe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cwe.md>), [embedded-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded-systems.md>), [hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hub.md>), [library](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/library.md>), [mesh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mesh.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [patched](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/patched.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Before BACnet Stack versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, bws_srv_start() created the BACnet/SC hub's libwebsockets server context with a CA certificate but did not require a valid client certificate. As a result, any network-reachable host could connect to the mesh without credentials. The issue is patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. The supplied text rates it HIGH, with a score of 8.1.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-102612 Published : Nov. 13, 2026, 7:17 p.m. | 13 minutes ago Description :BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, bws_srv_start() in ports/linux/websocket-srv.c builds the libwebsockets server context with a CA certificate loaded but never sets LWS_SERVER_OPTION_REQUIRE_VALID_OPENSSL_CLIENT_CERT, so the hub accepts TLS connections from clients presenting no certificate at all. Any network-reachable host can join the BACnet/SC mesh without credentials. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. Severity: 8.1 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Whose Agent Are You? Multi-Layer Fingerprinting and Attribution of Autonomous Web Agents

DevFeed: [Whose Agent Are You? Multi-Layer Fingerprinting and Attribution of Autonomous Web Agents](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/whose-agent-are-you-multi-layer-fingerprinting-and-attribution-of-autonomous-web-agents-131938.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.20910>)

Author: Dayeon Kang, Hyejun Jeong, Jade Sheffey, Pubali Datta, Amir Houmansadr

Published: 2026-11-13T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [AI Bots](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ai-bots.md>), [agentic browsing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/agentic-browsing.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [frontend security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/frontend-security.md>), [Browser Automation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/browser-automation.md>)

Tags: [actions](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/actions.md>), [agent](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent.md>), [agent-frameworks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agent-frameworks.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-web.md>), [architectures](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architectures.md>), [attribution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attribution.md>), [autogen](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autogen.md>), [autonomous](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/autonomous.md>), [behavior](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/behavior.md>), [bot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bot.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [browsing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsing.md>), [chatgpt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chatgpt.md>), [claude](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/claude.md>), [content](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content.md>), [content-protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/content-protection.md>), [crawlers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crawlers.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>)

### AI overview

The paper presents a multi-layer fingerprinting method to distinguish autonomous web agents from human visitors and traditional crawlers. A logging framework on an instrumented domain combines network characteristics, including TLS and HTTP behavior, with browser interaction patterns. Tested on AutoGen, Browser Use, Claude, Gemini, ChatGPT, and Skyvern, the features reveal differences in request construction, connection setup, and browser actions. A decision tree classifier reportedly achieved 100% accuracy in the study, identifying agent architectures and separating their traffic from human and legacy-crawler baselines. The authors propose cross-layer tracking as a way to support content protection and web security policy enforcement; the supplied abstract does not detail the evaluation conditions or limits of that accuracy result.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2606.20910v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI web agents proliferate, combining large language models with autonomous, browser-level control, indiscriminate content scraping by web agents has emerged as a privacy and security challenge. Existing defenses, such as robots.txt and active bot-blocking, are insufficient, as they are widely violated and easily circumvented. In this work, we demonstrate that AI web agents can be effectively distinguished from humans and traditional crawlers using a multi-layer fingerprint based on both network layer characteristics (e.g., TLS, HTTP) and browser interaction behavior. We implement this mechanism as a programmatic logging framework that can be deployed on a live, instrumented domain. By analyzing six prominent agent frameworks (AutoGen, Browser Use, Claude, Gemini, ChatGPT, and Skyvern), we uncover latent structural differences in how these systems assemble HTTP requests, establish TLS/HTTP connections, and execute autonomous browser actions. Feeding these multi-layer features into a decision tree classifier, our framework achieves high-fidelity identification (100% accuracy), successfully isolating distinct agent architectures and differentiating agent traffic from both human browsing baselines and legacy crawlers. Our findings demonstrate that cross-layer agent tracking provides a robust approach to content protection and web security policy enforcement.

## Inside X-VPN's 200%+ Speed Upgrade: 25 Gbps Servers, AI Routing and Talaria Protocol

DevFeed: [Inside X-VPN's 200%+ Speed Upgrade: 25 Gbps Servers, AI Routing and Talaria Protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/inside-x-vpn-s-200-speed-upgrade-25-gbps-servers-ai-routing-and-talaria-protocol-130535.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.cio.com/article/4247894/inside-x-vpns-200-speed-upgrade-25-gbps-servers-ai-routing-and-talaria-protocol.html>)

Author: CIO

Published: 2026-11-12T13:37:56Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [CIO](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cio.md>)

Topics: [Virtual Private Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/vpn.md>), [High-Performance Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/high-performance-computing.md>), [IP routing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ip-routing.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-routing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-routing.md>), [artificial-intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence.md>), [artificial-intelligence-network-security-security-vpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/artificial-intelligence-network-security-security-vpn.md>), [bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bandwidth.md>), [bare-metal](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bare-metal.md>), [canada](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/canada.md>), [capacity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capacity.md>), [computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computing.md>), [computing-hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computing-hardware.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [devices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devices.md>), [download](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/download.md>), [edition-us](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edition-us.md>), [europe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/europe.md>), [germany](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/germany.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [language-en](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/language-en.md>), [network-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-security.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [routing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routing.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [servers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/servers.md>), [speed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/speed.md>), [storytype-press-release](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/storytype-press-release.md>), [upgrade](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/upgrade.md>), [vpn](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vpn.md>)

### AI overview

X-VPN reports that its in-house Talaria protocol improved aggregate download and upload speeds by over 200% in its internal 10 Gbps tests versus its previous best-performing protocols; results may vary by device, network, and server. One Singapore-to-Singapore Windows test showed median download speed rising from 1,536 to 5,706 Mbps. The company also added 25 Gbps servers in the US and Canada, expanded 10 Gbps infrastructure in several other countries, and upgraded server hardware. Its account attributes efficiency gains to device and server data-path changes, plus AI routing that prioritizes connection candidates in batches and stops after successful authentication. Talaria uses separate channels for application connections, parallel processing, packet batching, and staged data handling. It includes TLS 1.3, hybrid post-quantum key exchange, authenticated encryption, and replay protection; an independent assessment reported no vulnerabilities and four resolved observations. X-VPN says Talaria is open source under AGPL v3 and available on its Windows, macOS, Android, and iOS apps, with performance and supported optimizations varying by platform and conditions.

### Source excerpt

Internal 10 Gbps tests showed over 200% aggregate improvement in download and upload speeds with Talaria. X-VPN has rolled out a speed upgrade spanning its network and new in-house Talaria protocol. In the company's internal 10 Gbps tests, Talaria delivered over 200% aggregate improvement in download and upload speeds compared with X-VPN's previous best-performing protocols. Alongside higher-bandwidth server infrastructure, X-VPN has improved route selection and how devices and servers process traffic. The changes are designed to make connections more efficient, from initial setup to sustained data transfer. Expanding Server Capacity to 25 Gbps X-VPN has introduced servers with 25 Gbps port capacity in the United States and Canada, alongside 10 Gbps infrastructure in Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK, Italy, and Singapore. More than 90% of X-VPN's VPN traffic in the US and Europe can now be served by 10 Gbps or 25 Gbps infrastructure. Beyond bandwidth, X-VPN has also upgraded its computing hardware. Its new bare-metal server configurations feature 64 CPU cores and 128-256 GB of memory, providing greater processing capacity to handle simultaneous connections and large volumes of network traffic. The additional bandwidth and computing resources give X-VPN more headroom to handle demanding traffic loads and support high-throughput connections. X-VPN's Speed Tests Show X-VPN conducted internal speed tests across Windows, macOS, Android, and iOS, with connections originating in Singapore and reaching VPN servers in Singapore, the UK, and the US. Across the 10 Gbps test configurations, Talaria achieved over 200% aggregate improvement in download and upload speeds compared with X-VPN's previous best-performing protocols. For example, in 10 Gbps Windows tests connecting to a Singapore VPN server, median download speed increased from 1,536 Mbps with the previous protocol to 5,706 Mbps with Talaria. In separate 1 Gbps tests measuring speed loss against connections witho

## CVE-2026-82509 - V Programming Language net.http TLS Certificate Validation Bypass

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-82509 - V Programming Language net.http TLS Certificate Validation Bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-82509-v-programming-language-net-http-tls-certificate-validation-bypass-126435.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82509>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-10T14:17:36Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [V](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/v.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [backends](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backends.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-82509](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-82509.md>), [fetch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fetch.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [handshakes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshakes.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [http-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http-post.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [interception](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interception.md>), [library](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/library.md>), [mbedtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mbedtls.md>), [net-http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net-http.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/openssl.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>)

### AI overview

V's `net.http` library through version 0.5.2, before commit 4077484, reportedly allows on-path attackers to intercept or modify HTTPS traffic because `SSLConnectConfig.validate` and `FetchConfig.validate` default to false. In both mbedtls and OpenSSL backends, TLS handshakes can complete without certificate verification; the description says this affects `http.get`, `http.post`, and `http.fetch`, including when presented with expired, self-signed, wrong-hostname, or untrusted-root certificates. It says to explicitly configure `validate: true` to require validation. The source's affected-products table lists none.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-82509 Published : Nov. 10, 2026, 2:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 13 minutes ago Description :V programming language standard library net.http through version 0.5.2 prior to commit 4077484 contains a TLS certificate validation bypass vulnerability that allows on-path attackers to intercept HTTPS traffic by exploiting the default false value of SSLConnectConfig.validate and FetchConfig.validate, which completes TLS handshakes without verifying certificates in both the mbedtls and OpenSSL backends. Attackers can present an expired, self-signed, wrong-hostname, or untrusted-root certificate to successfully complete the handshake via http.get, http.post, or http.fetch, enabling interception or modification of HTTPS traffic unless validate: true is explicitly configured. Severity: 9.1 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Design and Evaluation of Secure Distributed Chaotic Image Encryption on ESP32-S3

DevFeed: [Design and Evaluation of Secure Distributed Chaotic Image Encryption on ESP32-S3](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/design-and-evaluation-of-secure-distributed-chaotic-image-encryption-on-esp32-s3-126931.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10595>)

Author: Mohammed Almozaini, Fazal Noor, Sohail Alhazimi

Published: 2026-11-10T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [ESP32-S3](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/esp32-s3.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [ECDSA](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ecdsa.md>), [Image processing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/image-processing.md>), [sha256](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sha256.md>), [Image](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/image.md>)

Tags: [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [automatic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automatic.md>), [communication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/communication.md>), [correlation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/correlation.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [devices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devices.md>), [distributed](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/distributed.md>), [ecdsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdsa.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [entropy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/entropy.md>), [esp32-s3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/esp32-s3.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [experimental](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experimental.md>), [experiments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiments.md>), [failure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/failure.md>), [image](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/image.md>), [microcontrollers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microcontrollers.md>)

### AI overview

The system distributes chaotic image encryption across Wi-Fi-connected ESP32-S3 devices while preserving a logically continuous chaotic sequence: a master assigns block-specific starting states independently of which workers process them. It uses reversible chaotic substitution, ECDSA-signed discovery messages, and mutually authenticated TLS 1.3. In tests with one, two, and four workers, execution time fell from 43.215 to 15.878 seconds (2.72x speed-up). The encrypted image had entropy of 7.999940 bits/byte and near-zero adjacent-pixel correlation; matching SHA-256 hashes and SSIM of 1.0 confirmed exact recovery. Tests also showed operation across worker counts and block sizes, reassignment after worker failure, and rejection of a mismatched private key during TLS authentication.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.10595v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The limited computational resources of Internet of Things (IoT) devices present challenges for secure image processing. This paper presents a distributed chaotic image encryption system using independent Wi-Fi-connected ESP32-S3 microcontrollers. A master-worker architecture distributes image blocks through master-coordinated chaotic sequence management, maintaining one logically continuous chaotic sequence by assigning block-specific starting states independently of worker assignments. The implemented system uses reversible chaotic substitution (SUBSTITUTE), while Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)-signed discovery messages and Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 with mutual authentication secure device communication. Experimental evaluation using one, two, and four workers demonstrates a reduction in execution time from 43.215 to 15.878 seconds, achieving a speed-up of 2.72 times. The encrypted image achieves a Shannon entropy of 7.999940 bits/byte and near-zero adjacent-pixel correlation. Exact image recovery is verified through matching Secure Hash Algorithm 256-bit (SHA-256) hashes and a Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) value of 1.0. Additional experiments demonstrate successful encryption and decryption using different worker counts and block sizes, automatic task reassignment following worker failure, and rejection of a mismatched private key during TLS authentication. These findings demonstrate the feasibility of secure, flexible, and distributed chaotic image processing across independent resource-constrained IoT devices.

## CVE-2026-125402 - Ettercap through 0.8.4.1 Heap Out-of-Bounds Read via TLS SNI Parsing

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-125402 - Ettercap through 0.8.4.1 Heap Out-of-Bounds Read via TLS SNI Parsing](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-125402-ettercap-through-0-8-4-1-heap-out-of-bounds-read-via-tls-sni-parsing-124294.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125402>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-10T00:17:14Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [Memory Safety](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/memory-safety.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [c](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/c.md>), [crash](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crash.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-125402](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-125402.md>), [cvss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cvss.md>), [ettercap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ettercap.md>), [ettercap-project](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ettercap-project.md>), [heap](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/heap.md>), [interception](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interception.md>), [leak](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/leak.md>), [memory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/memory.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [parsing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parsing.md>), [published](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/published.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Ettercap through 0.8.4.1 has a heap out-of-bounds read in sslw_get_clienthello_sni() during SSL interception. The function trusts an unchecked 16-bit SNI length in a TLS ClientHello; network-adjacent attackers can send a crafted message to leak up to 64 KB of heap memory upstream or crash Ettercap. The supplied excerpt gives a severity of 8.1 (HIGH), but does not provide affected version details beyond the stated range or remediation steps.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-125402 Published : Nov. 10, 2026, 12:17 a.m. | 26 minutes ago Description :Ettercap through 0.8.4.1 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in sslw_get_clienthello_sni() in src/ec_sslwrap.c that trusts the unchecked 16-bit SNI length field. Network-adjacent attackers can send crafted TLS ClientHello messages during SSL interception to leak up to 64 KB of heap memory upstream or crash Ettercap. Severity: 8.1 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## Empirical Assessment of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in TLS

DevFeed: [Empirical Assessment of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in TLS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/empirical-assessment-of-post-quantum-cryptography-adoption-status-in-tls-122810.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09707>)

Author: Md Ariful Haque, Sander Vinberg, Ben Edwards, Jo\\~ao Cruz

Published: 2026-11-09T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Artificial Intelligence](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-artificial-intelligence.md>), [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [adoption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adoption.md>), [assessment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assessment.md>), [cloudflare](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloudflare.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cs-ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ai.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [deployment](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deployment.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [protocols](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocols.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

Across seven TLS-based protocols, the study reports PQC support concentrated in HTTPS and LDAPS: at the origin-server level, 9.1% of HTTPS and 7.39% of LDAPS servers supported PQC, while each other protocol was below 1%. At the entity level, support was 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, with all other protocols below 5%. The assessment used 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol and also examined adoption by organizational footprint and industry, plus Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. The supplied text is an abstract and does not provide details of those comparisons.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.09707v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Anticipating Q-day security concerns, major CDNs and cloud providers are migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While existing literature benchmarks PQC performance, empirical research evaluating real-world adoption data remains scarce. We present an empirical assessment of PQC deployment across seven critical protocols (HTTPS, LDAPS, SMTPS, IMAP-SSL, POP3-SSL, TELNETS, and RDP) using 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol. At the origin-server level, PQC algorithm support reaches 9.1% for HTTPS and 7.39% for LDAPS, while falling below 1% for all other evaluated protocols. At the entity level, PQC support is 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, while the remaining protocols have less than 5% of entities supporting PQC on the hosted servers. We further correlate these adoption trends against organizational digital and financial footprint, and industry sectors, yielding a multi-dimensional empirical assessment of PQC deployment. Finally, at the domain level, we perform a comparative analysis of PQC adoption in Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. Collectively, our findings provide critical insights into the current state of PQC readiness over Transport Layer Security (TLS).

## HeapDeck: an on-call monitor for PostgreSQL on iPhone and iPad

DevFeed: [HeapDeck: an on-call monitor for PostgreSQL on iPhone and iPad](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/heapdeck-an-on-call-monitor-for-postgresql-on-iphone-and-ipad-122265.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.postgresql.org/about/news/heapdeck-an-on-call-monitor-for-postgresql-on-iphone-and-ipad-3436/>)

Published: 2026-11-07T00:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [PostgreSQL news](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/postgresql-news.md>)

Topics: [PostgreSQL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/postgresql.md>), [database monitoring](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/database-monitoring.md>), [Monitoring & Alerting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/monitoring-alerting.md>), [dashboards](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/dashboards.md>), [iphone](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iphone.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssh.md>), [ipad](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ipad.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>)

Tags: [alerting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerting.md>), [alerts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerts.md>), [app-store](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/app-store.md>), [blocking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blocking.md>), [canada](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/canada.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [counts](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/counts.md>), [free](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/free.md>), [ipad](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ipad.md>), [iphone](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iphone.md>), [lag](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lag.md>), [locks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/locks.md>), [monitor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/monitor.md>), [native](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/native.md>), [on-call](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/on-call.md>), [pg-stat-statements](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pg-stat-statements.md>), [pinned](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pinned.md>), [postgresql](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postgresql.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

HeapDeck is a native iPhone and iPad monitor for PostgreSQL 13-19, designed to help on-call engineers inspect database health while the app is open. It presents a health verdict and ten tiles; its Locks screen builds a blocking tree from pg_blocking_pids() and shows how many sessions stopping the root blocker would free. Other views cover activity, transaction ID wraparound, dead tuples, replication lag and slots, and query statistics. Connections are direct or use an SSH tunnel, with TLS and pinned fingerprints; no vendor server sits between the phone and database. HeapDeck sends no alerts, so it complements existing alerting. Monitoring one server is free; a one-time HeapDeck Pro purchase adds more servers and actions including cancel, terminate, VACUUM, dropping a slot, and writes.

### Source excerpt

HeapDeck is a new native app for engineers on call for PostgreSQL 13 to 19, on the App Store for iPhone and iPad. It opens on one health verdict with ten tiles. The Locks screen draws the tree from pg_blocking_pids() with the root blocker on top and counts the sessions that stopping it would free. Other screens cover pg_stat_activity, transaction ID wraparound and dead tuples, replication lag and slots, and pg_stat_statements. The app uses a direct connection or an SSH tunnel, with TLS and pinned fingerprints. No vendor server sits between the phone and the database. It works while open and sends no alerts, so it goes next to your existing alerting. Monitoring one server is free. HeapDeck Pro is a one-time in-app purchase that adds more servers and the actions: cancel, terminate, VACUUM, dropping a slot and writes. https://heapdeck.app Postgres, PostgreSQL and the Slonik Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of the PostgreSQL Community Association of Canada, and used with their permission. HeapDeck is an independent client and is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by the PostgreSQL Community Association of Canada, PostgreSQL Global Development Group, PostgreSQL Project, PostgreSQL Core Team, or PostgreSQL Community.

## Addressing protocol security gaps in multi-tenant Kubernetes

DevFeed: [Addressing protocol security gaps in multi-tenant Kubernetes](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/addressing-protocol-security-gaps-in-multi-tenant-kubernetes-122100.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/addressing-protocol-security-gaps-in-multi-tenant-kubernetes/>)

Author: Ajinkya Patil

Published: 2026-11-06T21:08:50Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [AWS Security Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/aws-security-blog.md>)

Topics: [tenant data protection](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tenant-data-protection.md>), [adb](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/adb.md>), [Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service.md>), [WebRTC](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/webrtc.md>), [Access Control](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/access-control.md>), [container-networking](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/container-networking.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Protocol (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/protocol.md>)

Tags: [active-directory](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/active-directory.md>), [adb](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adb.md>), [amazon-eks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-eks.md>), [amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-elastic-kubernetes-service.md>), [amazon-kinesis-video-streams](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/amazon-kinesis-video-streams.md>), [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [android-debug-bridge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android-debug-bridge.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [authorization](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authorization.md>), [intermediate-200](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intermediate-200.md>), [kubernetes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kubernetes.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [pods](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pods.md>), [policies](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/policies.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [protocol-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol-security.md>), [protocols](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocols.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [security-blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-blog.md>), [security-identity-compliance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security-identity-compliance.md>), [technical-how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical-how-to.md>), [webrtc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/webrtc.md>)

### AI overview

The article describes a multi-tenant EKS design that adds security to unauthenticated protocols using namespace-scoped Envoy Gateway mTLS, short-lived certificates issued and rotated through cert-manager and AWS Private CA, and Kinesis Video Streams as managed TURN infrastructure for WebRTC. A custom API validates enterprise IdP JWTs, authorizes namespace access, returns connection details, and records identity, namespace, and time. The design depends on default-deny NetworkPolicies and namespace isolation; ADB traffic between Envoy and the pod is not encrypted, and immediate certificate revocation requires CRL or OCSP infrastructure. Compared with bastion forwarding through the Kubernetes API server, the reported Envoy path adds under 50 ms gateway latency, with ADB commands under 100 ms and installs under 30 seconds. Managed TURN removes the custom token-exchange service and, according to the article, kept WebRTC stable during peak use and removed manual routing updates after Availability Zone migrations. The post focuses on architecture and lessons, assumes existing EKS, IdP, and AWS Private CA setup, and notes that the JWT identity chain requires deployment-specific custom work

### Source excerpt

Protocols like Android Debug Bridge (ADB) and Web Real-Time Communication (WebRTC), by default, use unencrypted channels for network communications and don't support enterprise authentication mechanisms like JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). In a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster--including Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (Amazon EKS)--pods can reach other tenants' open ports by default unless you configure network policies to [...]

## Vulnerability in KAMSOFT ZSIRep CLIENT library

DevFeed: [Vulnerability in KAMSOFT ZSIRep CLIENT library](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/vulnerability-in-kamsoft-zsirep-client-library-121404.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/11/CVE-2026-113618/>)

Published: 2026-11-06T10:55:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cyber Newsroom](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cyber-newsroom.md>)

Topics: [client library](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/client-library.md>), [Library](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/library.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Exploit](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/exploit.md>), [SSL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/ssl.md>), [.NET Framework](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/net-framework.md>)

Tags: [client-library](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client-library.md>), [man-in-the-middle](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/man-in-the-middle.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

KAMSOFT ZSIRep CLIENT library versions before 2.12.3.1 accept any HTTPS certificate through a process-wide .NET callback, enabling man-in-the-middle attackers to impersonate the server and intercept or modify authentication data and documents. The callback remains active after the client closes, weakening other HTTPS connections in the same application. The issue is fixed in library version 2.12.3.1; the excerpt lists fixes in KS-SOMED, KS-PPS, KS-MEDIS, KS-SOLAB, and KS-ASW.

### Source excerpt

Vulnerability in KAMSOFT ZSIRep CLIENT library Vulnerability in KAMSOFT ZSIRep CLIENT library CVE ID CVE-2026-113618 Publication date 06 November 2026 Vendor KAMSOFT Product ZSIRep CLIENT library Vulnerable versions All before 2.12.3.1 Vulnerabili ... Read more Published Date: Nov 06, 2026 (6 hours, 18 minutes ago) Vulnerabilities has been mentioned in this article. CVE-2026-113618

## Vault Fork OpenBao Adds External Keys and Quantum-Ready TLS

DevFeed: [Vault Fork OpenBao Adds External Keys and Quantum-Ready TLS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/vault-fork-openbao-adds-external-keys-and-quantum-ready-tls-120955.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.infoq.com/news/2026/11/vault-fork-openbao-27/>)

Author: Matt Saunders

Published: 2026-11-06T09:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [InfoQ](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/infoq.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Secrets Management](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/secrets-management.md>), [HashiCorp Vault](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/hashicorp-vault.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Load Balancing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/load-balancing.md>)

Tags: [cloud-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-security.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [fork](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fork.md>), [hardware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware.md>), [hardware-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardware-security.md>), [hashicorp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hashicorp.md>), [human-review](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/human-review.md>), [kms](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/kms.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [postgresql](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/postgresql.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [vault](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vault.md>), [vault-fork-openbao-27](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vault-fork-openbao-27.md>)

### AI overview

OpenBao 2.7 extends PostgreSQL-backed deployments with read scaling and adds plugin-based use of HSM- or KMS-held keys in the PKI and Transit engines. It also adds ML-DSA and ML-KEM support across TLS listeners, certificate authentication, PKI, and Transit, enabling operators to test hybrid or post-quantum configurations; clients, certificate authorities, and surrounding systems must support the selected algorithms, so the features alone do not make a deployment quantum-safe. ACL `control_group` rules can require a second party to review access to specified paths. The release also moves several cloud auto-unseal and authentication integrations to plugins, discontinues the separate HSM distribution, and removes file storage, which lacked high availability and transactions and was not recommended for production. OpenBao remains MPL 2.0 under OpenSSF governance.

### Source excerpt

OpenBao has released version 2.7, adding read scaling for PostgreSQL-backed deployments, support for external hardware security module (HSM) and key management service (KMS) keys, and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. The release also introduces control groups for human review of sensitive operations and new headers intended to keep requests consistent across load-balanced OpenBao nodes. By Matt Saunders

## Ghostunnel: Open-source TLS proxy with mutual authentication

DevFeed: [Ghostunnel: Open-source TLS proxy with mutual authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/ghostunnel-open-source-tls-proxy-with-mutual-authentication-116034.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/04/ghostunnel-open-source-tls-proxy/>)

Author: Anamarija Pogorelec

Published: 2026-11-04T06:30:14Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Help Net Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/help-net-security.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>), [let's encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/let-s-encrypt.md>)

Tags: [apache-2-0](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apache-2-0.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [combined](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/combined.md>), [credentials](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/credentials.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [devsecops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devsecops.md>), [don-t-miss](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/don-t-miss.md>), [github](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/service.md>), [socket](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/socket.md>), [software](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software.md>), [ssl-tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssl-tls.md>), [tcp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tcp.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>), [unix](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/unix.md>)

### AI overview

Ghostunnel moves mutual TLS into a standalone proxy for applications that speak plaintext. In server mode it accepts TLS, checks client certificates, and forwards traffic over TCP or a UNIX socket; in client mode it wraps local plaintext connections in TLS and presents a client certificate. Server mode requires at least one access check, such as a certificate name, public key pin, or policy; checks can be combined with OR logic, and OPA policies can reload while the tunnel runs. Credentials can come from files, platform stores, SPIFFE, PKCS#11 hardware, or Let's Encrypt ACME in server mode, and certificates reload on SIGHUP or a timer. By default, listeners and targets are restricted to localhost or UNIX sockets unless unsafe flags are enabled; Linux uses Landlock sandboxing by default.

### Source excerpt

Ghostunnel is an open-source proxy that handles TLS for programs that cannot handle it themselves. It works in two directions. In server mode it sits in front of a backend, accepts TLS connections, checks the client's certificate, then passes traffic to the service behind it over TCP or a UNIX socket. In client mode it does the reverse, listening for plain local connections, wrapping them in TLS and presenting a client certificate to the remote ... More -> The post Ghostunnel: Open-source TLS proxy with mutual authentication appeared first on Help Net Security.

## Bilateral Protection for Private LoRA Inference with Intel TDX

DevFeed: [Bilateral Protection for Private LoRA Inference with Intel TDX](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/bilateral-protection-for-private-lora-inference-with-intel-tdx-116146.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04311>)

Author: Xiaodong Li, Mingyuan Ma, Dongbo Yan

Published: 2026-11-04T05:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [lora](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/lora.md>), [LLM security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/llm-security.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>)

Tags: [activation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/activation.md>), [adapter](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adapter.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [attestation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attestation.md>), [base](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/base.md>), [boot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/boot.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [connect](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connect.md>), [cost](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cost.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [decryption-key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decryption-key.md>), [design](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/design.md>), [domain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/domain.md>), [experiments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/experiments.md>), [inference](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/inference.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel.md>), [lora](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/lora.md>), [private](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/private.md>), [protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protection.md>)

### AI overview

The system uses Intel TDX to protect both client data and a LoRA owner's private weights while ensuring inference uses the approved application and adapter. The client and owner independently verify remote attestation, application identity, and a binding to the actual TLS public key before releasing inputs or the weight-decryption key. A fixed read-only image and verified-byte consumption link those identities to inference artifacts, with inference running inside the trust domain. On real TDX hardware, controlled application and boot-parameter changes were rejected before secrets were released. Protected and native CPU inference produced identical token sequences across 400 dialogue pairs; across 12 independent boots, the steady-state service-to-native time ratio was 1.0094 (95% interval 1.0064-1.0126).

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2611.04311v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cloud services using private low-rank adaptation (LoRA) must protect client inputs and outputs alongside owners' proprietary parameters and execute the approved adaptation. We design and implement a system for bilateral protection of private LoRA inference using Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX), connecting approved application identity to actual artifact consumption and adapter activation. The client and LoRA owner independently verify remote attestation, application identity, and binding to the actual Transport Layer Security (TLS) public key before releasing inputs and the weight-decryption key. A fixed read-only image and verified-byte consumption connect approved identities to inference objects, with all inference inside a trust domain. Experiments on real TDX hardware reject controlled application and boot-parameter modifications before secret release. Across 400 fixed dialogues, protected and native CPU inference in the same trust domain produce identical token sequences for all 400 pairs. Across 12 independent trust-domain boots, the steady-state service-to-native time ratio is 1.0094, with a 95% interval of [1.0064, 1.0126]. The system connects bilateral secret release, approved model use, and task-capability preservation, providing verifiable implementation and cost evidence for confidential inference with a public base and private adapter.

## What is StartTLS?

DevFeed: [What is StartTLS?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-is-starttls-126864.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.twilio.com/en-us/blog/insights/what-is-starttls>)

Author: Jesse Sumrak

Published: 2026-11-04T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Twilio](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/twilio-blog.md>), [Twilio Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/twilio-blog-2.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/email.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/errors.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [industry-insights](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/industry-insights.md>), [port](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/port.md>), [sendgrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sendgrid.md>), [smtp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smtp.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [upgrades](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/upgrades.md>), [what-is](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/what-is.md>), [works](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/works.md>)

### AI overview

StartTLS upgrades an initially unencrypted email connection to TLS; TLS is the encryption protocol, while StartTLS is the command that begins the upgrade. For SMTP submission, port 587 is standard, with ports 25 and 2525 also supporting StartTLS; port 465 uses implicit TLS from connection start. After the server advertises STARTTLS, the client requests it, completes a TLS handshake, and sends EHLO again over the encrypted connection. Opportunistic TLS falls back to plaintext if the recipient does not support encryption, while enforced TLS blocks delivery in that case. StartTLS protects each connection hop, not the message end to end, and the initial handshake can be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. The text advises enabling StartTLS in SMTP settings, using certificate verification, and checking port, server support, and TLS compatibility when troubleshooting. SendGrid accepts TLS connections on ports 25, 587, and 2525, and implicit TLS on 465; its default is opportunistic TLS, with enforced TLS available.

### Source excerpt

StartTLS is the SMTP command that upgrades an email connection to encrypted TLS. Learn how it works, which port to use, and how to fix common errors.

## Public TLS certificates drop client authentication: What breaks for mTLS

DevFeed: [Public TLS certificates drop client authentication: What breaks for mTLS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/public-tls-certificates-drop-client-authentication-what-breaks-for-mtls-107816.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://workos.com/blog/public-tls-certificates-client-authentication-mtls>)

Author: WorkOS

Published: 2026-10-30T11:13:55Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [WorkOS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/workos-blog.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [let's encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/let-s-encrypt.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssl.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-certificates.md>)

### AI overview

Publicly trusted TLS certificates used as mTLS client credentials may stop working when renewed: Chrome's policy requires subscriber certificates issued from March 15, 2027 to assert server authentication only, while CA cutoffs vary. DigiCert's cutoff is March 1, 2027; Sectigo's is February 10, 2027; Let's Encrypt's default profile already dropped clientAuth in February 2026. Existing certificates remain trusted until expiry, but renewals may omit the clientAuth EKU, causing purpose-checking stacks to reject them during handshakes. The excerpt recommends inventorying certificates and services that rely on public certificates for client authentication. Suggested paths include private PKI for internal use, X9 PKI or certain non-browser public roots for cross-organization use, and OAuth tokens; RFC 8705 also allows self-signed certificate-bound tokens. Tradeoffs include managing trust roots for private PKI and limited browser trust for DigiCert's named non-browser roots. CA-specific exceptions differ, including PSD2 QWAC treatment.

### Source excerpt

Public CAs and Chrome are removing clientAuth from TLS certificates by 2027. The dates per CA, what fails at renewal, and where mTLS should go next.

## What the Heck is Hardcharger?

DevFeed: [What the Heck is Hardcharger?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-the-heck-is-hardcharger-107729.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/what-the-heck-is-hardcharger?source=rss>)

Author: Shawn Gordon

Published: 2026-10-30T05:48:03Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [DuckDB](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/duckdb.md>), [Open Source](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/open-source.md>), [apache-arrow](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/apache-arrow.md>), [Streaming](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/streaming.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Query (disambiguation)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/query.md>), [cURL](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/curl.md>), [OpenAPI Specification](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openapi.md>), [Deno](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/deno.md>), [Documentation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/documentation.md>)

Tags: [access-control](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/access-control.md>), [admin](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/admin.md>), [administrator](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/administrator.md>), [agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/agents.md>), [ai](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai.md>), [ai-agents](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ai-agents.md>), [analytics](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/analytics.md>), [apache-2-0](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apache-2-0.md>), [apache-arrow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apache-arrow.md>), [arrow](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arrow.md>), [audit](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/audit.md>), [chargewire-protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chargewire-protocol.md>), [cloud-computing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-computing.md>), [duckdb](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/duckdb.md>), [duckdb-2-0](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/duckdb-2-0.md>), [gizmosql-successor](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gizmosql-successor.md>), [hackernoon-top-story](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hackernoon-top-story.md>), [hardcharger-explained](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hardcharger-explained.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [license](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/license.md>), [license-keys](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/license-keys.md>), [open-source](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/open-source.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [sql](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sql.md>)

### AI overview

Hardcharger is an Apache 2.0 DuckDB 2.0 server that replaces GizmoSQL with a from-scratch implementation and includes features that previously required GizmoSQL Enterprise licenses. Its Chargewire protocol carries Apache Arrow IPC data over ordinary HTTP/1.1 and TLS, with JSON control messages; it supports one-request short queries, asynchronous long queries, resumable downloads, and parallel result partitions. The article contrasts this with Arrow Flight SQL's gRPC transport, which the author says caused proxy and load-balancer problems and requires generated client code. Hardcharger's described security includes identity-bound handles, bearer tokens, OIDC and certificate authentication, plan-based access checks, and blocking access to sensitive host files. Included capabilities also cover granular roles and grants, row policies, masking, audit logs, monitoring, query controls, a web UI, and drivers for several languages. The author reports using its cloud service to share a DuckDB file and query it through an AI/MCP integration with a read-only token. Automatic startup on requests and running data collection apps on the server are described as desired future features.

### Source excerpt

Hardcharger is GizmoData's open-source DuckDB 2.0 server, built on Warp SQL, an HTTP protocol streaming Apache Arrow. Every feature included; no license keys.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md?cursor=WyIyMDI2LTEwLTMwVDA1OjQ4OjAzKzAwOjAwIiwgIjEyNTVlZDU3LTlmNjItNDUyMS1hMWQ3LWJhN2E3YWRhNTkxMSJd>)