# TLS handshake

The TLS handshake is a protocol procedure that authenticates communicating parties, negotiates cryptographic parameters, and establishes shared keying material for a secure channel.

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## CVE-2026-125275 - A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-125275 - A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-125275-a-device-certificate-whose-ca-isn-t-registered-can-keep-a-tls-handshake-running-forever-136468.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125275>)

Author: cvefeed.io

Published: 2026-11-17T03:17:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-125275](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-125275.md>), [database](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/database.md>), [denial-of-service](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/denial-of-service.md>), [erlang](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/erlang.md>), [erlang-otp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/erlang-otp.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [nerves-hub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub.md>), [nerves-hub-web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerves-hub-web.md>), [nerveshub](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nerveshub.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [root](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/root.md>), [store](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/store.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [verification](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/verification.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>)

### AI overview

In NervesHub versions 1.0.0 through before 2.5.4, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause denial of service by presenting a TLS client certificate whose chain reaches a root trusted by the device endpoint but contains no CA registered in NervesHub. The verification callback returns :unknown_ca; Erlang/OTP ssl treats this as a missing trust anchor, retries the same root indefinitely, and the handshake process repeatedly queries the database even after the client disconnects, until the node restarts. Public CA roots are trusted by default unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is configured, so a client-auth-capable certificate from a public CA can trigger the issue. A chain ending at a root outside the trust store is rejected once.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-125275 Published : Nov. 17, 2026, 3:17 a.m. | 1 hour, 3 minutes ago Description :Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts. The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4. Severity: 8.2 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## CVE-2026-82509 - V Programming Language net.http TLS Certificate Validation Bypass

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-82509 - V Programming Language net.http TLS Certificate Validation Bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-82509-v-programming-language-net-http-tls-certificate-validation-bypass-126435.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://cvefeed.io/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82509>)

Author: CVEFEED.io; vulncheck.com

Published: 2026-11-10T14:17:36Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Latest High/Critical Vulnerabilitiy Feed](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/latest-high-critical-vulnerabilitiy-feed.md>)

Topics: [V](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/v.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [backends](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backends.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [cve-2026-82509](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve-2026-82509.md>), [fetch](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fetch.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [handshakes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshakes.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [http-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http-post.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [interception](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/interception.md>), [library](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/library.md>), [mbedtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mbedtls.md>), [net-http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/net-http.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/openssl.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [validation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/validation.md>)

### AI overview

V's `net.http` library through version 0.5.2, before commit 4077484, reportedly allows on-path attackers to intercept or modify HTTPS traffic because `SSLConnectConfig.validate` and `FetchConfig.validate` default to false. In both mbedtls and OpenSSL backends, TLS handshakes can complete without certificate verification; the description says this affects `http.get`, `http.post`, and `http.fetch`, including when presented with expired, self-signed, wrong-hostname, or untrusted-root certificates. It says to explicitly configure `validate: true` to require validation. The source's affected-products table lists none.

### Source excerpt

CVE ID :CVE-2026-82509 Published : Nov. 10, 2026, 2:17 p.m. | 1 hour, 13 minutes ago Description :V programming language standard library net.http through version 0.5.2 prior to commit 4077484 contains a TLS certificate validation bypass vulnerability that allows on-path attackers to intercept HTTPS traffic by exploiting the default false value of SSLConnectConfig.validate and FetchConfig.validate, which completes TLS handshakes without verifying certificates in both the mbedtls and OpenSSL backends. Attackers can present an expired, self-signed, wrong-hostname, or untrusted-root certificate to successfully complete the handshake via http.get, http.post, or http.fetch, enabling interception or modification of HTTPS traffic unless validate: true is explicitly configured. Severity: 9.1 | CRITICAL Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

## What is StartTLS?

DevFeed: [What is StartTLS?](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-is-starttls-126864.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.twilio.com/en-us/blog/insights/what-is-starttls>)

Author: Jesse Sumrak

Published: 2026-11-04T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Twilio](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/twilio-blog.md>), [Twilio Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/twilio-blog-2.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/email.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [command](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/command.md>), [email](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/email.md>), [encrypted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encrypted.md>), [errors](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/errors.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [industry-insights](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/industry-insights.md>), [port](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/port.md>), [sendgrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sendgrid.md>), [smtp](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/smtp.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [upgrades](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/upgrades.md>), [what-is](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/what-is.md>), [works](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/works.md>)

### AI overview

StartTLS upgrades an initially unencrypted email connection to TLS; TLS is the encryption protocol, while StartTLS is the command that begins the upgrade. For SMTP submission, port 587 is standard, with ports 25 and 2525 also supporting StartTLS; port 465 uses implicit TLS from connection start. After the server advertises STARTTLS, the client requests it, completes a TLS handshake, and sends EHLO again over the encrypted connection. Opportunistic TLS falls back to plaintext if the recipient does not support encryption, while enforced TLS blocks delivery in that case. StartTLS protects each connection hop, not the message end to end, and the initial handshake can be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. The text advises enabling StartTLS in SMTP settings, using certificate verification, and checking port, server support, and TLS compatibility when troubleshooting. SendGrid accepts TLS connections on ports 25, 587, and 2525, and implicit TLS on 465; its default is opportunistic TLS, with enforced TLS available.

### Source excerpt

StartTLS is the SMTP command that upgrades an email connection to encrypted TLS. Learn how it works, which port to use, and how to fix common errors.

## Public TLS certificates drop client authentication: What breaks for mTLS

DevFeed: [Public TLS certificates drop client authentication: What breaks for mTLS](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/public-tls-certificates-drop-client-authentication-what-breaks-for-mtls-107816.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://workos.com/blog/public-tls-certificates-client-authentication-mtls>)

Author: WorkOS

Published: 2026-10-30T11:13:55Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [WorkOS](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/workos-blog.md>)

Topics: [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/authentication.md>), [let's encrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/let-s-encrypt.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssl.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [public](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-certificates.md>)

### AI overview

Publicly trusted TLS certificates used as mTLS client credentials may stop working when renewed: Chrome's policy requires subscriber certificates issued from March 15, 2027 to assert server authentication only, while CA cutoffs vary. DigiCert's cutoff is March 1, 2027; Sectigo's is February 10, 2027; Let's Encrypt's default profile already dropped clientAuth in February 2026. Existing certificates remain trusted until expiry, but renewals may omit the clientAuth EKU, causing purpose-checking stacks to reject them during handshakes. The excerpt recommends inventorying certificates and services that rely on public certificates for client authentication. Suggested paths include private PKI for internal use, X9 PKI or certain non-browser public roots for cross-organization use, and OAuth tokens; RFC 8705 also allows self-signed certificate-bound tokens. Tradeoffs include managing trust roots for private PKI and limited browser trust for DigiCert's named non-browser roots. CA-specific exceptions differ, including PSD2 QWAC treatment.

### Source excerpt

Public CAs and Chrome are removing clientAuth from TLS certificates by 2027. The dates per CA, what fails at renewal, and where mTLS should go next.

## TLS Flaws Found in GoAhead Web Server Used in Hundreds of Millions of Devices

DevFeed: [TLS Flaws Found in GoAhead Web Server Used in Hundreds of Millions of Devices](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/tls-flaws-found-in-goahead-web-server-used-in-hundreds-of-millions-of-devices-104428.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.securityweek.com/tls-flaws-found-in-goahead-web-server-used-in-hundreds-of-millions-of-devices/>)

Author: Eduard Kovacs

Published: 2026-10-28T13:10:34Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SecurityWeek](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/securityweek.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssl.md>), [Security research](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-research.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [bugs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bugs.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [bypass](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bypass.md>), [certificate-revocation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-revocation.md>), [crl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/crl.md>), [data-protection](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-protection.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [device](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/device.md>), [eavesdropping](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/eavesdropping.md>), [firewall](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firewall.md>), [firmware](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/firmware.md>), [goahead](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/goahead.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [vulnerabilities](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerabilities.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [web-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-server.md>)

### AI overview

FoxIO disclosed three GoAhead TLS flaws, each limited to particular versions, TLS libraries, and configurations. In GoAhead 3.4.5-6.1.0 using OpenSSL with mTLS and a CRL, the server reads the revocation list but does not check it, so revoked client certificates can still be accepted. In Mbed TLS builds from 4.0.2-6.1.0, a coding error weakens some TLS 1.2 connections, allowing recorded sessions to be decrypted offline if clients accept the flawed parameters. LibreSSL builds through 6.1.0 can bypass a certificate-chain length cap when client certificates from any issuer are accepted and the cap is the only safeguard. GoAhead 6.1.1 fixes the OpenSSL and Mbed TLS issues; other stated mitigations include disabling finite-field DHE or switching TLS backends, and enabling issuer verification with a trusted CA bundle for the LibreSSL issue. Device exposure depends on firmware configuration, and an upstream fix does not guarantee manufacturers have patched their products.

### Source excerpt

FoxIO disclosed three GoAhead TLS bugs that can let revoked certificates through or expose some encrypted sessions to eavesdroppers. The post TLS Flaws Found in GoAhead Web Server Used in Hundreds of Millions of Devices appeared first on SecurityWeek.

## GoAhead TLS Flaws Allow Revoked Client Certificates and Enable Session Decryption

DevFeed: [GoAhead TLS Flaws Allow Revoked Client Certificates and Enable Session Decryption](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/goahead-tls-flaws-allow-revoked-client-certificates-and-enable-session-decryption-102449.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/goahead-tls-flaws-allow-revoked-client.html>)

Author: The Hacker News

Published: 2026-10-27T13:59:48Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Cyber Newsroom](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/cyber-newsroom.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssl.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Security research](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-research.md>), [NVD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nvd.md>)

Tags: [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [backend](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backend.md>), [build](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/build.md>), [builds](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/builds.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [certificate-revocation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-revocation.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [device](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/device.md>), [ecdhe](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ecdhe.md>), [embedded](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/embedded.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [exploited](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exploited.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [iot-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot-security.md>), [login](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/login.md>), [network-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network-security.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [vulnerability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/vulnerability.md>), [web](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web.md>), [web-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-security.md>), [web-server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/web-server.md>)

### AI overview

GoAhead 6.1.1 fixes three TLS flaws, but exposure depends on how device makers compiled and configured the server. On OpenSSL builds with mutual TLS and a configured revocation list, revocation checking was never enabled, allowing a trusted client certificate listed as revoked to authenticate; Mbed TLS builds are unaffected by this flaw. A separate Mbed TLS issue can expose recorded session traffic only when a client accepts the undersized key exchange; mainstream clients reject it, and TLS 1.3, ECDHE, and Mbed TLS 4.x are unaffected. Certain older LibreSSL builds can accept overlong client certificate chains when issuer checking is off. Device makers must rebuild and ship firmware with 6.1.1, and it is unknown whether any have done so. The article reports no known attacks as of October 27, 2026, while noting that this does not rule out exploitation. It also says the release fixes a login bypass affecting some HTTP Basic or form-login builds; after upgrading, EmbedThis recommends ending active sessions, restarting the server, and changing passwords stored in Blowfish format.

### Source excerpt

GoAhead TLS Flaws Allow Revoked Client Certificates and Enable Session Decryption The GoAhead embedded web server loaded a certificate revocation list into its default TLS backend but never turned revocation checking on, so a revoked client certificate could still pass login on aff ... Read more Published Date: Oct 27, 2026 (4 hours, 56 minutes ago) Vulnerabilities has been mentioned in this article.

## Blog: Announcing Flux 2.10 GA

DevFeed: [Blog: Announcing Flux 2.10 GA](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/blog-announcing-flux-2-10-ga-100681.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://fluxcd.io/blog/2026/10/flux-v2.10.0/>)

Author: Leigh Capili

Published: 2026-10-26T11:00:00Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [Flux - Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/flux-blog.md>)

Topics: [SPIRE](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/spire.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [MSP MCP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/msp-mcp.md>), [CI/CD](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cicd.md>)

Tags: [2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2.md>), [alert](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alert.md>), [alerting](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/alerting.md>), [also](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/also.md>), [announce](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/announce.md>), [api](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api.md>), [apis](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/apis.md>), [arguments](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arguments.md>), [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [availability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/availability.md>), [based](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/based.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [broker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/broker.md>), [but](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/but.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [chat](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/chat.md>), [cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cli.md>), [cluster](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cluster.md>), [clusters](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clusters.md>), [flux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/flux.md>)

### AI overview

Flux v2.10 adds SPIFFE-based mutual TLS between Flux controllers and makes object identity generally available, with Kubernetes and SPIFFE credential providers. SPIFFE features require a configured SPIFFE Workload API; inter-controller traffic types are enabled independently and controller flags specify authorized identities. ArtifactGenerator can now write artifacts across namespaces after a SubjectAccessReview, and can optionally manage target namespaces with additional cluster-scoped RBAC. Flux alerting APIs Event, Alert, and Provider are stable v1; `flux migrate` updates stored resources and Git manifests, while deprecated v1beta3 fields are dropped. Upgrade planning must account for changed default RBAC required by Kubernetes-provider object identity, and the image reflector's new default tag database: existing BadgerDB data is not migrated and registries are rescanned. Other additions include new alerting providers, kubectl-style CLI arguments, inline OCIRepository Helm charts, image commit batching and push retries, plus SOPS and source verification improvements.

### Source excerpt

We are thrilled to announce the release of Flux v2.10.0! In this post, we highlight some of the new features and improvements included in this release. Highlights Flux v2.10 brings SPIFFE workload identity to the GitOps Toolkit. The Flux controllers can now authenticate each other with mutual TLS, and Flux objects can present short-lived SPIFFE credentials to registries, secret stores, remote Kubernetes clusters and more. This release also marks the General Availability of the Flux alerting APIs, with Event, Alert and Provider promoted to stable v1. In this release, we have introduced several new features to the Flux CLI and controllers: SPIFFE-based mutual TLS between the Flux controllers Object identity is now generally available (renamed from object-level workload identity), with a new SPIFFE credential provider as an alternative to the Kubernetes provider Cross-namespace artifact generation and tenant namespace provisioning The Event, Alert and Provider APIs promoted to stable v1 New alerting providers for Zoom Team Chat, incident.io, and Mastodon kubectl-style TYPE/NAME arguments across the Flux CLI OCIRepository as a chart template for HelmRelease Batched image update commits and push retries for image automation In ecosystem news, there is a new release of Flux Operator that extends the Flux Web UI with metrics and Node debugging views, and adds resource tracing, manifest diffing, and cluster event tools to the Flux MCP Server. SPIFFE Integration The headline feature of Flux v2.10 is the integration with SPIFFE, specified in RFC-0014. The RFC describes how Flux uses short-lived cryptographic material instead of static secrets, both for communication between the controllers and for identifying Flux objects with external systems. The SPIFFE Workload API must be configured for any of the SPIFFE features in Flux, including object identity. Object is powered by the SPIFFE Broker API, but for a Flux controller to connect to this API it first needs to acquire its ow

## HPQ-AKE: A Provably Secure Sign-Less Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Bandwidth-Constrained IoT and Edge Networks

DevFeed: [HPQ-AKE: A Provably Secure Sign-Less Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Bandwidth-Constrained IoT and Edge Networks](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/hpq-ake-a-provably-secure-sign-less-hybrid-authenticated-key-exchange-protocol-for-bandwidth-constrained-iot-and-edge-networks-96558.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12024>)

Author: Khiem Pham-Tuan, Minh Quang Le, Khuong Nguyen-An

Published: 2026-10-23T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>), [arXiv: Networking](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-networking.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Internet of things](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-3.md>), [arm](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arm.md>), [arxiv](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/arxiv.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bandwidth.md>), [benchmarking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmarking.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud.md>), [cloud-services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cloud-services.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [cs-ni](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-ni.md>), [edge](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/edge.md>), [evaluation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/evaluation.md>), [exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/exchange.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateway.md>), [gateways](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateways.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [key](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/key.md>), [networks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networks.md>), [protocol](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/protocol.md>)

### AI overview

HPQ-AKE replaces transcript signatures with dual KEMs for RSA-enabled IoT gateways and edge/cloud services: ML-KEM-768 provides post-quantum session secrecy and forward secrecy, while RSA-OAEP provides implicit mutual authentication. Its security analysis claims AKE security, forward secrecy, and conditional KCI resistance under Module-LWE and RSA assumptions, with long-term-key-only exposure assumptions. In evaluation, modeled handshake transmission falls 56.4% versus a Hybrid TLS 1.3 Full handshake (5,668 versus 13,009 bytes), with 7.11 ms local computation on the measured x86 testbed. A simulation of a 50 kbps link with 600 ms RTT reports median latency of 1,914 ms, 31.4% below baseline. The reported performance is based on x86 measurements and modeling; ARM gateway and unaccelerated microcontroller performance remains unvalidated.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.12024v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Securing bandwidth-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) and edge networks during post-quantum migration creates an authentication trade-off: ML-KEM provides post-quantum key establishment, whereas post-quantum signatures increase certificate-chain size, verification cost, and handshake latency. We present HPQ-AKE, a sign-less hybrid authenticated key exchange for RSA-enabled IoT gateways and edge/cloud services that replaces transcript signatures with dual KEMs. HPQ-AKE combines ML-KEM-768 for post-quantum session secrecy and forward secrecy with RSA-OAEP for implicit mutual authentication, preserving existing RSA-enabled infrastructure during migration. We analyze HPQ-AKE in an extended Bellare-Rogaway model, separating classical authentication in the Random Oracle Model from session-key secrecy in the Quantum Random Oracle Model. Under the Module-LWE and RSA assumptions, it establishes AKE security, forward secrecy, and conditional KCI resistance under the long-term-key-only exposure assumptions. Evaluation combines x86 micro-benchmarking, analytical latency modeling, and 10,000-iteration Monte Carlo simulation. HPQ-AKE reduces modeled handshake transmission from 13,009 to 5,668 Bytes, a 56.4% reduction relative to a Hybrid TLS 1.3 Full handshake, while requiring 7.11 ms of total local computation on the measured x86 testbed. Under a simulated 50 kbps satellite-like link with 600 ms RTT and stochastic jitter, median latency is 1,914 ms, 31.4% below the 2,791 ms baseline. At 20 ms RTT, modeled break-even thresholds are 0.31 Mbps against the pre-cached baseline and 4.08 Mbps against the full baseline; both decrease as RTT increases. These x86-based results motivate evaluation on gateway-class IoT and edge platforms; performance on ARM gateways and unaccelerated microcontrollers remains unvalidated.

## Accelerating HQC for Post-Quantum TLS 1.3 on x86 IoT Gateways

DevFeed: [Accelerating HQC for Post-Quantum TLS 1.3 on x86 IoT Gateways](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/accelerating-hqc-for-post-quantum-tls-1-3-on-x86-iot-gateways-93772.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11107>)

Author: Jihoon Jang, Hyunju Park, Jebin Kim, Seokhie Hong, Suhri Kim

Published: 2026-10-21T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [x86](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/x86.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>), [Internet of things](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/iot.md>)

Tags: [avx2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/avx2.md>), [bandwidth](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bandwidth.md>), [client](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/client.md>), [cpu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cpu.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [decoding](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decoding.md>), [generation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/generation.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [integrate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/integrate.md>), [intel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel.md>), [intel-core](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/intel-core.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [ml](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [network](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/network.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-1-3.md>), [x86](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x86.md>)

### AI overview

The work optimizes HQC on x86 using AVX2, AVX-512, and GFNI, then integrates the implementations into TLS 1.3. Changes include faster polynomial multiplication, Reed-Solomon and Reed-Muller decoding, SHA3-512, and fixed-weight sampling; HQC-5 also uses FAFFT multiplication with AVX-512 and GFNI. On an Intel Core i5-1135G7, AVX2 cuts decapsulation time by 11.1-21.5% versus prior AVX2 results. Across three parameter sets, AVX-512 improves key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation by 24.9-29.5%, 10.4-11.1%, and 20.6-26.1%, respectively, versus Cabral et al. In loopback TLS, HQC-5 handshake latency falls from 3.22 ms to 2.92 ms. On a 1 Mbit/s path with 50 ms added RTT, however, HQC-5 takes 243 ms versus 87 ms for ML-KEM-1024, with key and ciphertext sizes driving the remaining cost on constrained links.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.11107v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Post-quantum TLS at an IoT gateway must protect many device connections without large increases in handshake delay, CPU cost, or network traffic. HQC provides code-based diversity beyond ML-KEM, but its computation and ciphertext sizes can increase these costs. We optimize HQC for x86 processors with AVX2, AVX-512, and the Galois Field New Instructions (GFNI), and integrate the resulting implementations into TLS 1.3. We extend branch-free Toom-Cook/Karatsuba multiplication to AVX-512, accelerate Reed-Solomon decoding with GFNI, improve Reed-Muller decoding, accelerate SHA3-512 and fixed-weight sampling, and port Frobenius additive FFT (FAFFT) multiplication to AVX-512 + GFNI for HQC-5. On an Intel Core i5-1135G7 processor, our AVX2 implementation reduces decapsulation by 11.1-21.5% over the fastest prior AVX2 results. Our AVX-512 implementation reduces key generation by 24.9-29.5%, encapsulation by 10.4-11.1%, and decapsulation by 20.6-26.1% relative to Cabral et al. across the three HQC parameter sets. We evaluate the effects of these implementations on TLS 1.3 handshake latency and server and client CPU costs, as well as the effects of round-trip time (RTT) and bandwidth. In local loopback TLS measurements, our AVX-512 HQC-5 implementation reduces handshake latency from 3.22 ms to 2.92 ms compared with Cabral et al. On a constrained path with 1 Mbit/s bandwidth and an added RTT of 50 ms, the HQC-5 handshake takes 243 ms, compared with 87 ms for ML-KEM-1024. This indicates that HQC public-key and ciphertext sizes, rather than implementation speed, determine the remaining handshake cost on constrained links.

## Testing TLS 1.3 PQC on constrained devices and microcontrollers

DevFeed: [Testing TLS 1.3 PQC on constrained devices and microcontrollers](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/testing-tls-1-3-pqc-on-constrained-devices-and-microcontrollers-93826.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27766>)

Author: Olivier Gillot, William J. Buchanan, Callum Turino

Published: 2026-10-21T04:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [arXiv: Cryptography and Security](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/arxiv-cryptography-and-security.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Sustainable Computing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sustainable-computing.md>), [Embedded Software Dev](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/embedded-software-dev.md>), [MicroPython](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/micropython.md>)

Tags: [architecture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/architecture.md>), [assembly](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/assembly.md>), [benchmark](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/benchmark.md>), [cs-cr](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cs-cr.md>), [energy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/energy.md>), [esp32](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/esp32.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/implementation.md>), [iot](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/iot.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [microcontrollers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microcontrollers.md>), [ml-dsa](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-dsa.md>), [ml-kem](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ml-kem.md>), [pi](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pi.md>), [pico-2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pico-2.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc.md>), [testing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/testing.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-1-3.md>)

### AI overview

In wolfSSL TLS 1.3 benchmarks across four devices, post-quantum performance depended strongly on hardware and implementation. On the Pico W, full-PQC ML-KEM-512 plus ML-DSA-44 completed handshakes 41% faster than X25519 plus RSA-PSS and was up to 2.12 times as energy-efficient, depending on the authentication algorithm; on the ESP32, it was 8.9 times faster. Results across algorithm choices were similar on more capable devices. The tested X25519+ML-KEM-768 hybrid cost approximately as much as its two components combined, while pure ML-KEM may be more practical on hardware without Curve25519 assembly support. ML-DSA signing time varied, a limitation for applications requiring predictable latency. These findings reflect the tested implementation and devices.

### Source excerpt

arXiv:2610.27766v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The UK, EU and US governments have set timelines for post-quantum cryptography migration of critical systems, with deadlines ranging from 2028 to 2035. This paper focuses on IoT-class devices and microcontrollers and the viability of using PQC to connect these devices in secure TLS 1.3 connections. Using wolfSSL, we benchmark a 36-combination TLS 1.3 algorithm matrix, pairing ML-KEM-512/768/1024 and X25519/ECC P-256 key exchange with ML-DSA-44/65/87, Ed25519, ECDSA, and RSA-PSS authentication, across four devices (Raspberry Pi Pico W & Pico 2 W, ESP32, and a Raspberry Pi Zero), measuring both handshake latency and energy consumption. We found that in capable devices, all choices in the TLS matrix gave similar results, but that in IoT-class devices, PQC performance is highly implementation- and architecture-dependent: the common assumption that elliptic-curve key exchange must be cheaper than post-quantum lattice-based key exchange does not hold in this wolfSSL-based implementation, where the best full-PQC combination (ML-KEM-512 + ML-DSA-44) completes TLS handshakes 41% faster than the equivalent classical-modern pairing (X25519 + RSA-PSS) on the Pico W (up to 2.12x as energy-efficient, depending on the paired authentication algorithm), and 8.9x faster on the ESP32. Full-PQC, ML-KEM-512/ML-DSA-44, is not only possible but energy-competitive with or superior to Hybrid or Elliptic Curve alternatives on the most constrained devices, though ML-DSA's variable signing time means applications with strict latency-predictability budgets must accept this variance as the cost of full quantum-safe authentication. We further show that the IETF's draft-specified X25519+ML-KEM-768 hybrid incurs approximately the combined cost of its two components, rather than offering a performance compromise, making pure ML-KEM the more practical choice on hardware lacking Curve25519 assembly support.

## Understanding TLS 1.2 Handshakes, Mutual Authentication, and Certificate Formats

DevFeed: [Understanding TLS 1.2 Handshakes, Mutual Authentication, and Certificate Formats](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/understanding-tls-1-2-handshakes-mutual-authentication-and-certificate-formats-85741.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://hackernoon.com/understanding-tls-12-handshakes-mutual-authentication-and-certificate-formats?source=rss>)

Author: Lokesh Sanapalli

Published: 2026-10-12T17:17:50Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [HackerNoon](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hackernoon.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificates.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [AWS Certificate Manager](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/aws-certificate-manager.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/openssl.md>)

Tags: [aes](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/aes.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [base64](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/base64.md>), [certificate-authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authentication.md>), [certificates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificates.md>), [diffie-hellman](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/diffie-hellman.md>), [diffie-hellman-key-exchange](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/diffie-hellman-key-exchange.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [mutual-tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mutual-tls.md>), [openssl](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/openssl.md>), [ssl-vs-tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssl-vs-tls.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-1-2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-1-2.md>), [tls-1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-1-3.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains the TLS 1.2 handshake, including how clients and servers negotiate cryptographic parameters, validate certificates, derive shared keys, and begin encrypted communication. It also describes mutual TLS authentication and compares common certificate file formats, including PEM, DER, PKCS#12, and P7B.

### Source excerpt

SSL and TLS are both protocols: sets of rules for how a client and server agree on encryption. mTLS adds another verification step where client also verifies

## (Post-Quantum) Cryptographic Right Answers

DevFeed: [(Post-Quantum) Cryptographic Right Answers](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/post-quantum-cryptographic-right-answers-85203.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://words.filippo.io/right-answers/>)

Author: Filippo Valsorda

Published: 2026-10-12T12:00:27Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Filippo Valsorda](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/filippo-valsorda.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/encryption.md>), [Passkeys](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/passkeys.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [allows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/allows.md>), [attacks](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attacks.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [built-in](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/built-in.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [thomas-ptacek](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/thomas-ptacek.md>)

### AI overview

An updated set of cryptographic recommendations for developers reflects the accelerated post-quantum transition. It recommends post-quantum algorithms for key exchange, asymmetric encryption and signatures, alongside guidance on symmetric encryption, password handling, TLS, application security and backups.

### Source excerpt

In the tradition started by Colin Percival and Thomas Ptacek, a set of "Cryptographic Right Answers" updated for the accelerated post-quantum transition timeline.

## What Every Android Engineer Needs to Know About SHA-1, SHA-256, and Beyond

DevFeed: [What Every Android Engineer Needs to Know About SHA-1, SHA-256, and Beyond](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/what-every-android-engineer-needs-to-know-about-sha-1-sha-256-and-beyond-84569.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://proandroiddev.com/what-every-android-engineer-needs-to-know-about-sha-1-sha-256-and-beyond-5517317038d9?source=rss----c72404660798---4>)

Author: Vikas Soni

Published: 2026-10-10T17:33:17Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [ProAndroidDev](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/proandroiddev-medium.md>)

Topics: [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [sha256](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/sha256.md>), [Android](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/android.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [android](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android.md>), [android-engineer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/android-engineer.md>), [blockchain](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blockchain.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [mobile](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mobile.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [sha-256](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sha-256.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

This article explains how cryptographic hashes work and why Android engineers should avoid SHA-1 for security-sensitive uses. It discusses SHA-256 in app signing and TLS, BLAKE3's parallel performance, and the effect quantum search could have on hash security.

### Source excerpt

As a mobile engineer, you've probably seen terms like SHA-1 and SHA-256 pop up everywhere--in your IDE warnings, API documentation, and app signing configurations. But what do they actually mean, and why should you care? Think of a cryptographic hash function as a digital fingerprint generator. You can feed it any data -- an entire APK, a user's password, a simple string -- and it will spit out a unique, fixed-size string of characters called a hash. This article will break down what these hashes are, why the old standard (SHA-1) is dangerous, why SHA-256 is the current champ, and what the fast and exciting future looks like. The 3 Golden Rules of Secure Hashes A secure hash function is like a magical, one-way blender. You can put ingredients in and get a smoothie, but you can never turn that smoothie back into the original ingredients. This "magic" relies on three core security properties: Pre-image Resistance (The One-Way Street): Given a hash, you can't figure out the original input. This is why we store password hashes instead of the passwords themselves. If a database leaks, attackers get a list of hashes, not the actual passwords. Second-Preimage Resistance (The No-Imposter Rule): If you have a file and its hash, nobody can create a different file that produces the same hash. This is crucial for verifying that an app update you've downloaded hasn't been tampered with. Collision Resistance (The No-Evil-Twins Rule): This is the big one. Nobody should be able to find any two different inputs that create the same hash. A failure here is catastrophic, as it means a hacker could craft a malicious file that has the same "fingerprint" as a legitimate one. The Story of SHA-1: The Fallen Hero For years, SHA-1 was the king. It was used for everything: signing apps, securing websites (SSL/TLS certificates), and verifying file integrity. It produces a 160-bit hash. So, what went wrong? In short, it became too predictable. The final nail in the coffin came in 2017 with the SHA

## Harvest Now, Decrypt Later Is Already Your Problem

DevFeed: [Harvest Now, Decrypt Later Is Already Your Problem](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/harvest-now-decrypt-later-is-already-your-problem-83985.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.devops.dev/harvest-now-decrypt-later-is-already-your-problem-29e634ca0f07?source=rss----33f8b2d9a328---4>)

Author: Daniel Valev

Published: 2026-10-09T10:11:46Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [DevOps.dev](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/devops-dev.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [recording](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/recording.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [about](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/about.md>), [adversary](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/adversary.md>), [attack](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/attack.md>), [browser](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browser.md>), [browsers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/browsers.md>), [but](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/but.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [capture](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/capture.md>), [certs](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certs.md>), [computer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computer.md>), [computers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/computers.md>), [cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cybersecurity.md>), [decrypt](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/decrypt.md>), [devops](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/devops.md>), [heres](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/heres.md>), [how-to](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/how-to.md>), [hybrid](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/hybrid.md>), [major](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/major.md>), [post-quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [programming](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/programming.md>), [quantum](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/quantum.md>), [servers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/servers.md>), [software-engineering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/software-engineering.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt argues that harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks make post-quantum TLS a current concern: an adversary can record TLS traffic now and potentially decrypt sessions later if they used classical key exchange such as ECDHE or RSA. It says hybrid post-quantum TLS is already available in major browsers, but servers may fail to negotiate it, sometimes because of outdated curve-list configuration. The excerpt does not include the advertised server-checking steps.

### Source excerpt

Hybrid post-quantum TLS already ships in every major browser. Your servers are the part that's lagging -- here's how to check them in five... Continue reading on DevOps.dev "

## X25519-only TLS ends for GHE.com on October 7

DevFeed: [X25519-only TLS ends for GHE.com on October 7](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/x25519-only-tls-ends-for-ghe-com-on-october-7-71400.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://github.blog/changelog/2026-09-30-x25519-only-tls-ends-for-ghe-com-on-september-15>)

Author: Allison

Published: 2026-09-30T13:30:24Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [GitHub Changelog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/github-changelog.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [clients](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/clients.md>), [connectivity](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/connectivity.md>), [data-residency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data-residency.md>), [fips](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fips.md>), [github-cli](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-cli.md>), [github-enterprise-cloud](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/github-enterprise-cloud.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [libraries](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/libraries.md>), [october](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/october.md>), [operating-system](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operating-system.md>), [operating-systems](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/operating-systems.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [runtime](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/runtime.md>), [ssh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ssh.md>), [support](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/support.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [update](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/update.md>), [x25519](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x25519.md>)

### AI overview

Starting October 7, 2026, GitHub Enterprise Cloud with data residency will reject HTTPS connections from clients configured to offer only X25519 for TLS key agreement. The affected endpoints will still support FIPS-approved P-256 and P-384; current browsers, operating systems, GitHub CLI releases, and common TLS libraries already support P-256. Applications, proxies, security appliances, or TLS libraries restricted to X25519 may be affected. Before the date, update those components to supported versions, remove X25519-only settings, and ensure P-256 is enabled; P-384 is optional. SSH connectivity is unaffected, and the change applies only to GitHub Enterprise Cloud with data residency.

### Source excerpt

Beginning October 7, 2026, GitHub Enterprise Cloud with data residency will no longer accept TLS connections from clients that offer only X25519 for key agreement. Most customers don't need to...

## Daiwa and Deloitte break PQC implementation into manageable steps

DevFeed: [Daiwa and Deloitte break PQC implementation into manageable steps](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/daiwa-and-deloitte-break-pqc-implementation-into-manageable-steps-50690.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://siliconangle.com/2026/09/17/daiwa-deloitte-break-pqc-implementation-manageable-steps-digicertworldquantumreadinessday/>)

Author: Victoria Gayton

Published: 2026-09-17T19:00:46Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [SiliconANGLE](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/siliconangle.md>)

Topics: [Post-quantum cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/migration.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>), [Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security-privacy-and-abuse-prevention.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [colin-soutar](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/colin-soutar.md>), [cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cryptography.md>), [cube-event-coverage](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cube-event-coverage.md>), [daiwa-institute-of-research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/daiwa-institute-of-research.md>), [deloitte-touche-tohmatsu](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/deloitte-touche-tohmatsu.md>), [digicert](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digicert.md>), [digicert-s-world-quantum-readiness-day-2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digicert-s-world-quantum-readiness-day-2026.md>), [digicertworldquantumreadinessday](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/digicertworldquantumreadinessday.md>), [fips-203](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fips-203.md>), [migration](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/migration.md>), [module-lattice-based-key-encapsulation-mechanism](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/module-lattice-based-key-encapsulation-mechanism.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [nist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nist.md>), [post-quantum-cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/post-quantum-cryptography.md>), [pqc](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc.md>), [pqc-implementation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/pqc-implementation.md>), [products](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/products.md>), [public-key-infrastructure](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/public-key-infrastructure.md>), [sadaaki-yamaziki](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sadaaki-yamaziki.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [technical](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/technical.md>), [thecube](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/thecube.md>), [tom-hellebeek](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tom-hellebeek.md>), [transport-layer-security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/transport-layer-security.md>), [world-quantum-readiness-day-2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/world-quantum-readiness-day-2026.md>), [x25519mlkem768](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/x25519mlkem768.md>)

### AI overview

Daiwa and Deloitte describe post-quantum cryptography as an enterprise migration program involving staged testing, planning for dependencies, and coordination across budgets, products, and governance. Daiwa tested a hybrid approach for an online trading system and measured the effect on TLS performance, finding a small increase in handshake time in its high-bandwidth data-center environment while noting that bandwidth-constrained environments require separate validation.

### Source excerpt

PQC implementation becomes more manageable when organizations treat it as a migration program rather than a physics problem. As the post-quantum cryptography transition moves from discussion to implementation, organizations can test what is ready while planning around unresolved dependencies. Even straightforward technical changes can take years once budgets, products and governance enter the picture. Practical [...] The post Daiwa and Deloitte break PQC implementation into manageable steps appeared first on SiliconANGLE.

## Running a Self-Hosted Tailscale Control Server Behind a Reverse Proxy

DevFeed: [Running a Self-Hosted Tailscale Control Server Behind a Reverse Proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/running-a-self-hosted-tailscale-control-server-behind-a-reverse-proxy-34104.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://philipptheserver.com/posts/headscale-behind-traefik-no-h2/>)

Author: Philipp Lehmann (philipp.lehmann@gruppe.ai)

Published: 2026-09-15T07:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Philipp Lehmann](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/philipp-lehmann.md>)

Topics: [tailscale](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tailscale.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/proxy.md>), [traefik](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/traefik.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/self-hosted.md>), [Homelab](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/homelab.md>)

Tags: [dns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dns.md>), [docker](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/docker.md>), [h2](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/h2.md>), [homelab](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/homelab.md>), [networking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networking.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [reverse-proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reverse-proxy.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [self-hosted](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/self-hosted.md>), [tailscale](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tailscale.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>), [traefik](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traefik.md>)

### AI overview

This tutorial explains how to run a self-hosted Tailscale control server, Headscale, behind Traefik. It finds that the reverse proxy must use TLS with HTTP/1.1 only because Tailscale's noise handshake expects a full-duplex byte stream and can fail when ALPN negotiates HTTP/2.

### Source excerpt

Headscale behind Traefik: tls.options=no-h2@file with alpnProtocols http/1.1, because the Tailscale noise handshake breaks when ALPN negotiates h2.

## PowerDNS DNSdist 2.1.2 and 2.0.9 Released

DevFeed: [PowerDNS DNSdist 2.1.2 and 2.0.9 Released](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/powerdns-dnsdist-2-1-2-and-2-0-9-released-52716.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://blog.powerdns.com/2026/09/08/powerdns-dnsdist-2.1.2-and-2.0.9>)

Author: Remi Gacogne

Published: 2026-09-08T08:17:03Z

Content type: release

Language: en

Sources: [PowerDNS Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/powerdns-blog.md>)

Topics: [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/powerdns.md>), [Security](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/security.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [Prometheus](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/prometheus.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [YAML](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/yaml.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>)

Tags: [backends](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/backends.md>), [dnsdist](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/dnsdist.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [latest-releases](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latest-releases.md>), [news](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/news.md>), [parsing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/parsing.md>), [powerdns](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/powerdns.md>), [prometheus](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/prometheus.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>), [yaml](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/yaml.md>)

### AI overview

PowerDNS released DNSdist 2.1.2 and 2.0.9 with fixes for DoQ and DoH3 handling, QAT support, TLS ALPN advertising, YAML parsing crashes, Prometheus metrics, dashboard timeouts, Lua bindings, and other issues. The releases also upgrade Quiche to 0.29.3 to address low-severity security issues.

### Source excerpt

Today we released DNSdist 2.1.2 and 2.0.9, fixing several issues. The notable ones are:

## Using observability to verify TLS certificate rotation in production

DevFeed: [Using observability to verify TLS certificate rotation in production](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/your-tls-rotation-is-not-reliable-until-production-proves-it-34025.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://sridharrajarao.com/blog/tls-rotation-observability/>)

Author: Sridhar Rajarao

Published: 2026-08-13T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Sridhar Rajarao](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/sridhar-rajarao.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [observability](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/observability.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Automation](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/automation.md>), [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nginx.md>), [Kubernetes](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kubernetes.md>)

Tags: [automation](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/automation.md>), [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nginx.md>), [observability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/observability.md>), [reliability](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reliability.md>), [sre](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sre.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>)

### AI overview

The article explains that automating certificate renewal does not prove that production endpoints serve the new certificate. It recommends externally probing customer-facing endpoints and measuring certificate details and real TLS handshakes across proxies, regions, ingress controllers, CDNs, gateways, and other endpoints.

### Source excerpt

Automation renews a certificate. Observability proves every endpoint is serving it and customers can complete a TLS handshake.

## CVE-2026-47291: Remote Code Execution in the Windows HTTP.sys

DevFeed: [CVE-2026-47291: Remote Code Execution in the Windows HTTP.sys](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/cve-2026-47291-remote-code-execution-in-the-windows-http-sys-91905.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2026/7/9/cve-2026-47291-remote-code-execution-in-the-windows-httpsys>)

Author: TrendAI Research Team

Published: 2026-07-10T14:00:00Z

Content type: news

Language: en

Sources: [Zero Day Initiative - Blog](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/zero-day-initiative-blog.md>)

Topics: [HTTP](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/http.md>), [Windows](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/windows.md>), [Kernel](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/kernel.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>)

Tags: [1-3](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/1-3.md>), [2026](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/2026.md>), [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [applications](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/applications.md>), [blog-post](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog-post.md>), [buffer](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/buffer.md>), [bug](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/bug.md>), [caching](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/caching.md>), [can](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/can.md>), [channel](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/channel.md>), [code](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code.md>), [code-execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/code-execution.md>), [condition](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/condition.md>), [covering](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/covering.md>), [cve](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/cve.md>), [data](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/data.md>), [execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/execution.md>), [http](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/http.md>), [remote](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote.md>), [remote-code-execution](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/remote-code-execution.md>), [research](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/research.md>), [windows](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/windows.md>)

### AI overview

CVE-2026-47291 is an integer overflow in Windows HTTP.sys buffer reference growth during HTTP/1.x header parsing over TLS. When each short header line arrives in a separate TLS record, an attacker can drive the 16-bit capacity field to wrap to zero; the next growth allocates 40 bytes while copying over 500 KB, causing a kernel pool overflow. A remote unauthenticated attacker needs a request of roughly 262 KB, so MaxRequestBytes must be at least that large; the default 16 KB setting is insufficient, and keeping it at or below 65,535 bytes is described as the most conservative mitigation. HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, and request body parsing, do not follow the affected path. Detection by decrypting TLS and counting over 1,000 header lines is preferred; encrypted TLS-record heuristics can produce false positives and negatives. Microsoft patched the issue in its June 2026 release cycle; the report recommends deploying the vendor patch.

### Source excerpt

In this excerpt of a TrendAI Research Services vulnerability report, Yazhi Wang and Jonathan Lein of the TrendAI Research team detail a recently patched remote code execution bug in the Windows HTTP protocol stack. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can result in a denial-of-service condition, or, in the worst case, code execution with kernel privileges. The following is a portion of their write-up covering CVE-2026-47291, with a few minimal modifications. A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the HTTP Protocol Stack for Microsoft Internet Information Services implemented in HTTP.sys. The vulnerability is due to invalid validating incoming HTTP requests. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted HTTP packets to the target system. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can result in a denial-of-service condition, or, in the worst case, code execution with kernel privileges. The Vulnerability HTTP.sys is the kernel-mode HTTP protocol driver in Microsoft Windows. It provides HTTP request parsing, response caching, and SSL/TLS termination for Internet Information Services (IIS) and other applications that register URL prefixes. The driver listens on configured TCP ports (commonly 80 for HTTP and 443 for HTTPS) and processes inbound HTTP/1.x and HTTP/2 requests at the kernel level. When operating over HTTPS, HTTP.sys delegates TLS processing to the Windows Secure Channel (SChannel) provider. Inbound TCP data is decrypted on a per-record basis: each TLS record constitutes an independent unit of encryption and is decrypted separately by SChannel before being delivered to HTTP.sys as a distinct plaintext buffer. A single TLS 1.3 application data record has the following structure: The decrypted payload of each TLS record is delivered independently to the HTTP parser via UlHttpBufferReceiveEvent(), regardless of how many TLS records the underlying TCP connection coalesces into a single TCP segment. This b

## Nginx tuning tips: HTTPS/TLS - Turbocharge TTFB/Latency

DevFeed: [Nginx tuning tips: HTTPS/TLS - Turbocharge TTFB/Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/nginx-tuning-tips-https-tls-turbocharge-ttfb-latency-20880.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://linuxblog.io/nginx-tuning-tips-tls-ssl-https-ttfb-latency/>)

Author: Hayden James

Published: 2026-06-10T12:06:18Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [Hayden James](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/hayden-james.md>)

Topics: [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/nginx.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Latency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/latency.md>), [Cryptography](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cryptography.md>)

Tags: [application](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/application.md>), [blog](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/blog.md>), [guide](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/guide.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [https](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/https.md>), [latency](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/latency.md>), [linux](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/linux.md>), [nginx](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/nginx.md>), [overhead](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/overhead.md>), [performance](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/performance.md>), [request](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/request.md>), [reuse](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/reuse.md>), [security](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/security.md>), [server](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/server.md>), [sysadmins](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/sysadmins.md>), [tips](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tips.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>)

### AI overview

The excerpt says Nginx TLS tuning can reduce handshake overhead and improve connection reuse, shaving milliseconds from HTTPS requests, but it will not fix a slow application: backend work often dominates TTFB. The guide focuses on TLS, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 settings intended to reduce latency while retaining modern security. It recommends TLS 1.2 or 1.3 and says SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 should be disabled; the excerpt does not include the specific Nginx configuration steps.

### Source excerpt

Nginx TLS tuning won't fix a slow application, but it does cut handshake overhead and improve connection reuse, which shaves milliseconds off every HTTPS request. Continue reading...

## Simplifying Egress Routing to Wildcard Destinations

DevFeed: [Simplifying Egress Routing to Wildcard Destinations](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/simplifying-egress-routing-to-wildcard-destinations-48811.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://istio.io/latest/blog/2026/egress-dynamic-dns/>)

Author: Rudrakh Panigrahi (Salesforce)

Published: 2026-04-09T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [Istio](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/istio-blog.md>)

Topics: [istio](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/istio.md>), [service-mesh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/service-mesh.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/gateway.md>), [Network](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/network.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/proxy.md>)

Tags: [ambient](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ambient.md>), [egress](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/egress.md>), [gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/gateway.md>), [istio](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/istio.md>), [mesh](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mesh.md>), [microservices](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/microservices.md>), [networking](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/networking.md>), [proxy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/proxy.md>), [routing](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/routing.md>), [service-entry](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/service-entry.md>), [services](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/services.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>), [traffic](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic.md>), [traffic-management](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic-management.md>), [waypoint](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/waypoint.md>), [wildcard](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/wildcard.md>)

### AI overview

This article explains Istio support for wildcard ServiceEntry resources with DYNAMIC_DNS resolution. The feature lets sidecars route HTTPS traffic to wildcard destinations while reducing the need to register dynamic subdomains individually. It also describes the earlier egress-gateway and SNI-based approach.

### Source excerpt

Overview Controlling egress traffic is a common requirement in service mesh deployments. Many organizations configure their mesh to allow only explicitly registered external services by setting: meshConfig.outboundTrafficPolicy.mode = REGISTRY_ONLY With this configuration, any external destination must be registered in the mesh using resources such as ServiceEntry with fully qualified domain names and a DNS resolution type. apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1 kind: ServiceEntry metadata: name: external-wikipedia-https namespace: istio-system spec: hosts: - "www.wikipedia.org" ports: - name: tls number: 443 protocol: TLS location: MESH_EXTERNAL resolution: DNS exportTo: - "*" However, some external services expose many dynamic subdomains where applications may need to access endpoints such as: https://en.wikipedia.org https://de.wikipedia.org https://upload.wikipedia.org As the list of hostnames grows, registering each one individually quickly becomes impractical to manage and scale. To address this, Istio needs support for wildcard hostname registration. Why wildcard HTTPS egress is difficult When a workload initiates an HTTPS connection, the destination hostname is transmitted in the TLS handshake via the Server Name Indication (SNI) field. For example, a client calling https://en.wikipedia.org sends the hostname en.wikipedia.org in the ClientHello SNI field during the TLS handshake. Istio sidecars intercept outbound connections and determine whether the destination is registered and how it should be routed. However, Istio's routing model normally requires the upstream destination to be known ahead of time. Even if a wildcard match is used in routing rules, the final upstream cluster must still correspond to a statically configured service. Because different subdomains may resolve to different endpoints, routing directly to wildcard hosts was historically not straightforward. SNI routing via Egress Gateway This problem was previously addressed in the Istio blog post

## Block DDoS attacks with JA4 fingerprints

DevFeed: [Block DDoS attacks with JA4 fingerprints](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/block-ddos-attacks-with-ja4-fingerprints-83196.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://ngrok.com/blog/block-ddos-ja4-fingerprints>)

Author: Allison Carlisle

Published: 2025-05-08T00:00:00Z

Content type: tutorial

Language: en

Sources: [\[ngrok news\]](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ngrok-news.md>)

Topics: [rate-limiting](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/rate-limiting.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [Cybersecurity](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/cybersecurity.md>)

Tags: [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [block](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/block.md>), [ddos](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ddos.md>), [fingerprint](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/fingerprint.md>), [handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/handshake.md>), [headers](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/headers.md>), [ngrok](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ngrok.md>), [product-updates](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/product-updates.md>), [tls-handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls-handshake.md>), [traffic-policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic-policy.md>)

### AI overview

The article explains how JA4 TLS client fingerprints can help protect applications and APIs. It describes using ngrok Traffic Policy to identify traffic patterns, then block fingerprints, rate limit traffic, or allow-list known clients. JA4 can add a layer of protection against unwanted traffic, but it does not identify a specific user or replace authentication.

### Source excerpt

Tired of spoofed headers? Use JA4 to fingerprint clients by their TLS handshake, then rate limit, block, or allow-list them with ngrok Traffic Policy.

## Terminate TLS however (and wherever) you want with Traffic Policy

DevFeed: [Terminate TLS however (and wherever) you want with Traffic Policy](<https://devfeed.tech/articles/terminate-tls-however-and-wherever-you-want-with-traffic-policy-83338.md>)

Original publisher: [Read original article](<https://ngrok.com/blog/terminate-tls-traffic-policy>)

Author: Joel Hans

Published: 2025-04-23T00:00:00Z

Content type: article

Language: en

Sources: [\[ngrok news\]](<https://devfeed.tech/sources/ngrok-news.md>)

Topics: [TLS (Transport Layer Security)](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls.md>), [TLS handshake](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md>), [service-mesh](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/service-mesh.md>), [Certificate Transparency](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/certificate-transparency.md>), [Load Balancing](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/load-balancing.md>)

Tags: [api-gateway](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/api-gateway.md>), [authentication](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/authentication.md>), [certificate](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate.md>), [certificate-authority](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/certificate-authority.md>), [declarative](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/declarative.md>), [e2e](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/e2e.md>), [encryption](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/encryption.md>), [has](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/has.md>), [mtls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/mtls.md>), [ngrok](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/ngrok.md>), [tls](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/tls.md>), [traffic-policy](<https://devfeed.tech/tags/traffic-policy.md>)

### AI overview

ngrok describes its terminate-tls Traffic Policy action for controlling where TLS connections are terminated and how client certificates are validated. The article covers TLS 1.2 and 1.3, certificate provisioning and custom certificates, mTLS configuration, and routing requests based on SNI.

### Source excerpt

Need custom certs? Want fast mTLS setup? ngrok's terminate-tls action gives you complete TLS control from one declarative config.

[Next page](<https://devfeed.tech/topics/tls-handshake.md?cursor=WyIyMDI1LTA0LTIzVDAwOjAwOjAwKzAwOjAwIiwgIjA2OTdjMjllLWRjMzEtNDVmNS1iM2ZhLTI0NDU0NGJiNjJlNCJd>)